

EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION

Mihail CARADAICĂ*

Abstract

What is the relation between globalization and the process of European integration? Does the European integration have its own way, or is it deeply dependent on globalization? Those are the main questions I will try to answer in this paper by using an alternative critical approach: neo-gramscianism. Neo-gramscianism is a historical materialist view on the European integration process and international political economy which offers a better understanding of the social changes in terms of social forces agency and super structural influence (the neoliberal ideology of globalization and European integration).

My aim is to analyze the globalization process through a neo-gramscian theoretical framework and to observe how its main components affect European Integration. I will do this by assuming the definition of globalization provided by Andreas Bieler, who understands this process through three main pillars: transnationalization of finance, transnationalization of production and ideological shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. Finally I will try to formulate some conclusions regarding the emergence of European Round Table of Industrialists – the first lobby group of big capital at the European Union level – and Economic and Monetary Union – the internal market program that symbolizes the shift to neo-liberalism.

Keywords: *Globalization, European Integration, Critical Theory, Neo-gramscianism, Social Forces.*

1. Introduction

Globalisation is one of the most used terms for the economic, social and political changes that are specific for the end of XX century and the beginning of the XXI. A very general definition of this concept refers “to a set of processes that have increased interconnectedness across the globe, and where, crucially, these connections in many respects transcend the narrow boundaries of the nation-state” (Kiely 2005, 1). In this way, globalisation gives rise to new challenges for the nation state that is more and more pressed to collaborate with others instead of choosing armed force¹.

My critical approach instead, will try to understand globalisation from both material and ideological point of view. The classical Marxist interpretation of this process is mainly based on the development of the relations of production. Paul Wetherly states that Karl Marx is one of the first theorists of globalisation because he observed in The Communist Manifesto the bourgeoisie’s tendency to expand all over the world in the search for profit². Thus capitalism appears like a global system which can overturn the cultural and physical borders

* PhD Candidate, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (mihai.caradaica@gmail.com). Beneficiary of the project „Doctoral and Postdoctoral Scholarships for Young Researchers in the Fields of Political Science, Administrative Science, Communication Science and Sociology” co-funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013”.

¹ “This was linked not only to the end of the Cold War, but also to the idea that there are genuinely global problems that require cooperation between states, which saw the rise of various institutions of multilateral global governance, and the emergence of a transnational civil society, in which global, non-state actors could put pressure on nation-states and international institutions in order to facilitate ‘global justice’” (Kiely 2005, 2).

² For more details see Wetherly, Paul. *Marxism and the State. An Analytical Approach*. Palgrave Macmillan. New York: 2005, p. 200.

through the price system: “The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves” (Marx and Engels 1948, 13). Consequently, capitalism has a progressive impact on the world because it develops the productive forces and increases the number of proletariat. In this way, “capitalism created its own gravedigger because the working class would, through its cooperative and unifying role in the process of production, eventually overthrow capitalism and create a society (socialism) in which everybody lived off the social surplus product. This process would occur globally, as what we would now call a transnational capitalist class exploited a transnational proletariat, and so nation-states and national differences would gradually be eroded by the dynamic, expansionary but exploitative nature of capitalism” (Kiely 2005, 58).

But the foreseen revolution didn't happen even after the death of Marx, and other thinkers started to look for theoretical gaps in Marxism, or to give an original interpretation to it. One of the most important thinkers is Antonio Gramsci who, analysing the Italian situation, believed that the revolution was delayed because of some ideological aspects. The working class consciousness was filled with bourgeois values until it was convinced that this reality is the only possible reality. Here is where I fit my research and my analysis of globalisation: between the mutual influence of base (social relation of production) and superstructure (ideological aspects). The Magnus Ryner definition captures this point of view focusing on ideology (crisis of Keynesian state) and on the relation of production (transnationalisation of production): “At the present the term globalization is often used, and the ‘crisis of the welfare state’ is almost as often associated with it. At the same time, the term is rarely defined, or it is used in a frustratingly vague way. On a descriptive level it is generally associated with the breakdown of communication bottlenecks and a transnationalisation of economic activities, such as trade, investment and production. In more systematic studies, the issue is often reduced to a quantitative one, where trans-border transactions are measured” (Ryner 2002, 100). Furthermore, I will develop this point of view to generate a more complex understanding of globalisation.

Until this, I will introduce the main concepts I am going to use, outlining the neo-gramscian approach³ of explaining European Integration. Thus, the integration process is seen as the output of the activity of both structure (relations of production) and superstructure (impact of neoliberal ideology). Summarily, a neo-gramscian analysis will focus on the existence of a historical bloc that could achieve or not hegemonic level. Moreover, the engine of social changes is considered to be the agency of social forces and implicitly the class struggle.

The most important aspect of neo-gramscianism is represented by its focusing on social forces engendered by the production process and understood as the most important collective actor. „Consequently, various fractions of labour and capital may be identified in relation to their place in the production system. This makes structural changes such as **globalisation accessible**, since the emergence of new social forces engendered by the transnationalisation of production and finance can be incorporated” (Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. *Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 17). Those social forces, being engendered by the production process, are related with social classes in classical Marxist theory. Social classes are therefore regarded as social forces whose cohesion derives from its role in the production process. „Consequently, class is defined as a relation

³ This approach, as van Apeldoorn also affirms, has its roots in the “historical materialism that emphasizes the role of transnational social forces in the construction of the European socio-economic order” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 11).

and the various fractions of labour and capital can be identified by relating them to their place in the production system” (Bieler 2000, 10).

To further explore the nature of social forces, Bieler and Morton make the following distinctions: (1) national social forces - are derived from national production sectors; (2) transnational social forces – transnational forces of capital and labour engendered by the process of transnational production. Moreover, „the first group can be further sub-divided into nationally-oriented capital and labour, which stem from domestic production sectors which produce for the national market, and internationally-oriented capital and labour, engendered by domestic production sectors, which produce for the international market” (Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. *Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 17). I would like to state that, however, considering the economical characteristics of the XXI century, it becomes difficult to imagine an exclusively national type of capitalism which has absolutely no connection with global production. Thus, we cannot talk about an exclusively national capital, but we can talk instead about forms of capital interested by national protectionism, which are not able to compete on global market because they would not survive.

Furthermore, because this research belongs to a neo-gramscian approach, it will consequently emphasise the independent role of ideas. Firstly, those ideas are part of a social structure as intersubjective meanings and, as Robert Cox suggest, the individuals or groups of individuals become aware of their social condition and about possibilities of change. Secondly, „ideas may be used by actors as ‘weapons’ in order to legitimise particular policies and are important in that they form part of a hegemonic project by organic intellectuals” (Bieler 2000, 13). Thus, I will discuss further to what extent the concepts of historical bloc and hegemony will help me to explain the process of European integration.

One of the most important elements of the neo-gramscian theory is represented by the concept of historical bloc. „At a basic level of understanding, a historical bloc is an alliance of classes or fractions of classes, which attempts to establish a particular form of state and/or world order preferable to them. Nevertheless, a historical bloc is more than a simple alliance of social forces” (Bieler 2000, 14). This concept involves a unity between structure and superstructure forming a complex dynamic of social forces which include economic, political and cultural aspects. „Various social forces may attempt to do this by forming an **historical bloc** to establish preferable forms of governance at the national, European and/or international level” (Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. *Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 20).

Another important aspect of neo-gramscianism is the concept of hegemony⁴. This is a form of leadership which is more likely characterized by consent than coercion. „Additionally, a hegemonic order is based on a historical bloc that does not necessarily coincide with the boundaries of a state, but may be established at a transnational level” (Bieler 2000, 14). From another perspective, hegemony could be seen as a form of social leadership: „Ideas are essential for constituting political coalitions. They constitute or define interests of social groups. At the same time, they may also seek to legitimate these interests vis-à-vis other social groups. Thus ideational practice is an important element of constituting social leadership” (Drahokoupil, Jan, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn. *Introduction: Towards a Critical Political Economy of European Governance* in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 9). To achieve those things, the hegemony should not contain

⁴ This concept should not be confounded with the neorealist version developed by Gilpin or Keohane, “in which a hegemonic state controls and dominates other states and the international order thanks to its superior amount of economic and military capabilities” (Bieler 2000, 14).

only the interests of the dominant social group, but it should also incorporate “other (opposing) interests into the hegemonic world view and thus transcending the narrow selfinterests of the leading group” (Drahokoupil, Jan, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Laura Horn. *Introduction: Towards a Critical Political Economy of European Governance* in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 9).

Considering the situation of nowadays European Union, some scholars like Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Stephen Gill⁵ or Dorothee Bhole⁶ are discussing the superstructural dimension of European Integration in terms of neoliberal hegemony. The most important here is van Apeldoorn who states that the European project is neoliberal because it “aimed at the restoration and expansion of capitalist class power through an ideological commitment to the freedom of market exchange and to the absolute exercise of capitalist property rights, it was particularly within the European context that the new neoliberal policy paradigm had to adjust to the persisting traditions of corporatist industrial relations (‘social partnership’)” (van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan. “The Contradictions of ‘Embedded Neoliberalism’ and Europe’s Multi-level Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and its Limits” in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 9). Also, regarding the social and industrial protection offered by the state intervention, Apeldoorn uses the term ‘embeddedness’. In consequence, embedded neoliberalism encompasses former neo-mercantilists, the European labour movement, and social-democratic political forces.

To conclude, European integration is seen and analysed from two perspectives: the first one is the social forces agency which can explain also the process of globalization by considering the lobby activity of transnational social forces; and the second one is analysing the ideological dimension of European integration – which is known today as the neoliberal project. Thus, using a neo-gramscian approach, globalisation is seen as a central pillar in understanding the integration process. To see how exactly it has affected European integration, in the next chapter I am going to provide a deep explanation of the components of globalisation.

2. Content

2.1. Neo-gramscian view on globalization

In this section I will understand globalization from a political economy perspective. Thus, I will follow Andreas Bieler who state that globalisation is “characterised by two interlinked processes, the transnationalisation of finance and production at the material level, and a shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism at the ideological level⁷” (Bieler 2000, 19). With an accent on both, economic and ideological processes (structural and super-structural in Marxist terms) this approach is encompassed in the neo-gramscian research area. The changes on material level could not take the shape of nowadays globalisation without a strong ideological principle like the free market or minimal state intervention.

⁵ Stephen Gill states that it is not the moment to talk about a neoliberal hegemony, but one can identify a supremacy of neoliberalism. For more details see Gill, S. (2003) “A Neo-Gramscian Approach to European Integration” in Cafruny, A.W. and Ryner M. “A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe”, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, p 47-71.

⁶ For more details see Bhole, Dorothee, “Neoliberal Hegemony, Transnational Capital and the Terms of EU’s Eastwards Expansion”, *Capital and Class*, Issue 85, 2006, 57-86.

⁷ Andreas Bieler’s perspective on globalization is inspired from Robert Cox who refers to globalisation in two principal aspects: “(1) global organisations of production (complex transnational networks of production which source the various components of the product in places offering the most advantage on costs, markets, taxes, and access to suitable labour, and also the advantages of political security and predictability); and (2) global finance (a very largely unregulated system of transactions in money, credit, and equities)” (Cox, Robert. *Structural Issues of Global Governance: Implications for Europe* in Gill 1993, 259-260).

2.1.1. Transnationalization of finance

The first characteristic of globalization, as it was defined by the Andreas Bieler and Robert Cox, is the transnationalisation of finance. The elements that constitute it are, on the one hand, the emergence of offshore markets and deregulation process, and on the other hand the emergence of Transnational Corporations. Regarding the first element, Andrea Bieler states that “the transnationalisation of finance has led to the emergence of a fully-fledged global financial market. The first component of this process was the rise of financial offshore markets” (Bieler 2000, 19)

The offshore markets could be understood in relation with the expansion of the banks' operations which depended on two types of innovation: technical⁸ and structural⁹. “Structural innovation began with the creation of **offshore**, relatively unregulated Eurocurrency markets in the 1960s, as US banks searched for ways to get round irksome (and costly) domestic restrictions” (Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 43). To emphasise the real impact of the offshore markets, Bieler said that “between 1973 and 1984 there was a huge growth in offshore markets to \$1,000 billion, from levels of only \$3 billion and \$75 billion in 1960 and 1970 respectively” (Bieler 2000, 20).

The other component of the transnationalisation of finance is deeply connected with the financial offshore markets. I am talking here about more deregulation of money markets and financial operators, policies introduced by the United States. Due to the competitive pressure, other major financial centres of the world followed: in 1979 the British government abolished the control of capitalism¹⁰, Japan followed in 1980, and then entire European Union, New Zealand, Australia and Scandinavian Countries (Helleiner 1994, 149–166). “Eventually, due to the deregulation of national financial markets, the differences between them and offshore markets disappeared and an integrated global financial market emerged” (Bieler 2000, 20). Also, Bieler adds that it was not an inevitable process, but it was the result of governmental decisions.

The other component of the transnationalization of finance is the emergence and development of Transnational Corporations: “the growth of transnational corporations (TNCs), in numbers and size, has driven the transnational organisation of production. Their increasing importance is expressed in the rise of foreign direct investment (FDI)” (Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. *Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 4). To make a better view on the impact of transnational corporations on global economy and finance, I will discuss few documents of the United Nations Conferences. The first one, World Investment Report 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth, is dealing with the role of the Transnational Corporations on international economy and argues that the “increasing importance of transnational corporations in the growth process of developing countries arises not merely from the recent upsurge in the volume of foreign direct investment, but also from a number of major structural changes in the world economy which place transnational corporations in a central position as arbiters of the international division of labour” (UNCTAD 1992, 7). Those changes that the document is talking about are: the

⁸ “Technical innovations have included the idea of arranging money transfers by issuing chequebooks, the use of plastic credit and cheque cards or the automatic, electronic transfer of funds and chequeclearing systems between banks” (Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 43).

⁹ “Structural innovation means the introduction of new credit instruments or the development of new kinds of business by banks, such as the invention by Citibank of Certificates of Deposit in 1965 or the introduction of Money Market Funds and NOW accounts by Merrill Lynch in the mid-1970s” (Stopford, Strange and Henley 1991, 43).

¹⁰ The Keynesianism break down.

increasing importance of the market forces, technological development, the globalization of industries, the emerging services world economy, the regionalization of the world economy¹¹.

The best way to describe the real dimension of the Transnational Corporations impact is to monitor the foreign direct investment¹² (FDI). Thus, “the upward trend in world FDI flows set a new record in 1997: inflows grew by 19 per cent, to \$400 billion, while outflows, after a decline in 1996, rose by 27 per cent, to reach \$424 billion, the first time that the \$400 billion mark had been reached and passed. World FDI flows today are nearly twice what they had been in 1990, and some sevenfold their volume in 1980” (UNCTAD 1998, 8). The number of TNCs that were involved in this process since 1990 is around 35.000, as the United Nations Report suggest, and 150,000 foreign affiliates (UNCTAD 1992, 6). In this way, the process of globalisation led to the transnational restructuring of social relations. “The deregulation of national financial markets was institutionalised in the Internal Market programme, which stated that all remaining capital controls of member states had to be abolished by 1 July 1990. Only Greece and Portugal were given an extended period (until the end of 1995)” (Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. *Introduction: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy and the Relevance to European Integration* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 5). To conclude, the significance of the European companies and/or TNCs increased in the field of economy and employment year after year, putting the European Union in the situation to change itself or to be a less competitive entity in the world economy.

2.1.2. Transnationalization of production

Robert Cox was the first one studying the transnationalization of production from a neo-gramscian perspective. He argues that internationalization of production has a formative role in the field of international relations through generating changes in the state structure and world order. Also, “international production expands through direct investment, whereas the rentier imperialism, of which Hobson and Lenin wrote, primary took the form of portfolio investment. With portfolio investment, control over the productive resources financed by the transaction passed with ownership to the borrower” (Cox, Robert. *Social Forces, States, and World Orders* in Keohane 1986, 233). Thus, one could say that using direct investment it is possible to achieve control in the field of production.

In the core of this project stay, as I mentioned above, the growing number and size of Transnational Corporations¹³. Those market forces design a new dynamic of global economy understood as globalisation, a term which merely refers to the intensification of economic

¹¹ “1. The increasing importance of market forces-63 developing countries have liberalized their trade policy regimes since the beginning of the Uruguay Round and some 30 developing and Central and Eastern European countries liberalized their foreign direct investment regimes in 1991 alone. 2. Technology and the shrinking of economic space—in a number of industries, particularly service industries which have witnessed the most dramatic explosion in foreign direct investment during the decade of 1980s, access to powerful computer-communication networks, owned by single firms or a group of firms, is increasingly becoming the basis of international transactions. 3. The globalization of industries-several key industries (for example, automobiles, electronics) are becoming increasingly globalized, a process in which transnational corporations integrate, co-ordinate and control cross-border value-adding activities. 4. The emerging services world economy-the new world economy is increasingly a services economy and since services are largely non-tradable (though tradability has been increased in some cases due to technological changes), foreign direct investment is typically crucial for access to efficient services. 5. The regionalization of the world economy— transnational corporations are both reacting by way of developing strategic responses to regional integration arrangements and influencing the nature of such arrangements” (UNCTAD 1992, 7-8).

¹² FDI means an investment made by a company or entity based in one country in the field of production or business of another country through its companies or other economical entities.

¹³ The difference between the multinational corporations and transnational corporations is that while the first “attempts to deconcentrate the production in several countries or regions, to avoid the negative impact of the trade barriers, transnational corporations deliberately tends towards a *division of labor* inside the company and expanded to the global level” (Dîrdală, Lucian-Dumitru. *Actori în sistemul internațional* in Miroiu and Ungureanu 2006, 53).

relations across the world. “To be sure, economics¹⁴ were a big part of the globalization story, for gigantic compression of time and space would have been impossible without the worldwide expansion of markets, the rise of transnational corporations (TNCs), and the intensification of economic flows across the globe” (Stager and Roy 2010, 52).

On a similar manner, the rise of transnational corporations’ importance is indicated by the growing rate of foreign direct investments¹⁵. “The significance of FDI demonstrates the close connection between the transnationalisation of production and finance. The deregulation of national currency control systems was a precondition for the free movement of capital, making an increased level of FDI possible” (Bieler 2000, 20-21).

Furthermore, Bieler states that the FDI increase on its own cannot indicate the overall importance of the TNCs in the world economy. The best way of doing this is to compare the FDIs with world exports and world output. Between 1983 and 1989, world foreign-direct-investment outflows had a 28.9% rate of annual growth, which represent three times more than world exports – 9.4% (UN 1991, 4). “This is further confirmed by the indicator of the global sales of foreign affiliates in host countries, which is better suited for the comparison with trade flows, since it includes the value of output of TNCs’ activities in contrast to FDI” (Bieler 2000, 21).

2.1.3. Ideological shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism

The last component of globalization is ideology. All of those changes on material level like commerce or technology occurred also because of some ideological assumptions that precisely steered the economy to liberalization and state minimization. Regarding technology, as I argued above using Andreas Bieler’s ideas, it could also have been used by the state to increase its power, in the absence of neoliberal ideology. “The public interpretation of globalization as a mostly economic phenomenon driven by the irreversible dynamics of the free market and cutting edge technology was encouraged by executives of large transnational corporations, corporate lobbyists, prominent journalists and public-relations specialists, cultural elites and entertainment celebrities – and political leaders like Bill Clinton who articulated their neoliberal agenda within such a ‘globalist’ framework” (Stager and Roy 2010, 53). In this way, globalization is filled with neoliberal ideas which forge market globalism across all national and cultural borders¹⁶.

¹⁴ Stager and Roy argue also that “these economic developments were facilitated by the rapid transformation of information, communication, and transportation technology – a ‘digital revolution’ epitomized by the proliferation of personal computers, the Internet, satellite TV, standardized containers, fibre-optic cables, electronic barcodes, and global supply chains” (Stager and Roy 2010, 52). But I will follow here Andreas Bieler argument that those technologies could also have been used by the states to prevent transnationalisation through strengthening national controls and regulations (Bieler 2000, 19). According to this, a very important role is shifted to the ideological dimension, as I will explain in the next section.

¹⁵ “The decade of the 1990s promises to be one in which foreign direct investment will play a major role in shaping world economic development and the structure of the international economy. Since recovering from slow growth in the early 1980s, global flows of foreign direct investment have increased far more rapidly than world trade and output, reaching nearly \$200 billion in 1989, for a total world stock of \$1.5 trillion. Developing countries remain relatively marginalized in the rapid rise of global foreign-direct-investment flows: of total outflow in 1990, \$163 billion were invested in developed countries and \$30 billion in developing countries” (UN 1991, 83).

¹⁶ To be more specific, one of the most important claims of neoliberalism regarding globalization “presents the creation of globally integrating markets as a rational process that furthers individual freedom and material progress in the world. The underlying assumption here is that markets and consumerist principles are universally applicable because they appeal to all (self-interested) human beings regardless of their social context. Not even stark cultural differences should be seen as obstacles in the establishment of a single global free market in goods, services, and capital. A related neoliberal claim states that the liberalization of trade and the global integration of markets will ultimately benefit all people materially” (Stager and Roy 2010, 53).

Another important neoliberal claim “portrays the liberalization and global integration of markets as inevitable and irreversible, almost like some natural force such as the weather or gravity. This assertion makes it easier for neoliberals to convince people that they must adapt to the inherent rules of the free market if they are to survive and prosper” (Stager and Roy 2010, 53).

Following Manfred Stager and Ravi Roy, there are five claims of the market globalism:

- “Claim 1: Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets.
- Claim 2: Globalization is inevitable and irresistible.
- Claim 3: Nobody is in charge of globalization.
- Claim 4: Globalization benefits everyone (in the long run...).
- Claim 5: Globalization furthers the spread of democracy and freedom in the world” (Stager and Roy 2010, 54).

All of those claims have also an important impact at the policy level of globalisation. The consequent design illustrates “a world in which the actions of governments, as well as firms and workers, are internally and externally disciplined by market forces, or, to put it differently, by the power of capital” (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 50). For example, financial integration is limiting the possibility of a country to adopt a policy that has a negative influence on the medium-term financial stability. “The disciplining effect of global financial and product markets applies not only to policymakers, via financial market pressures, but also to the private sector, by making it more difficult to sustain unwarranted wage increases and price markups. Rather than acting as a constraint on the pursuit of appropriate policies, globalization can provide added leverage to such policies. It may also provide added flexibility” (Dailami and Haque 1998, 7-8). The point here is that, in the end, the pressure of globalisation will determine national states to apply the ideological assumption to their own policies that are in the benefit of the transnational capital.

The emergence of neoliberalism was a historical event that occurred at the beginning of 1980s, due to the crisis of Keynesianism – the dominant economic and social model of capitalism since the end of the Second World War. This model, known as the middle way between capitalism and communism¹⁷, was characterised by a high intervention of the state on market, capital regulations and the stress on full employment¹⁸. Neoliberalism re-launched the old principles of classical liberalism¹⁹ and adapted them to the context of the global economy. Consequently, “this shift can be observed in all three major instances of regionalism: the EU, the North American Free Trade Area and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation” (Bieler 2000, 22).

Thus, in the next sections I will make a further discussion on how exactly the forces of globalization and neoliberal ideology worked together to shape the new face of European Union after Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht. But until then, I will bring into the analysis two more concepts that will help me to better understand the impact of globalisation: internationalization of the state and transnational historical bloc.

2.1.4. State under globalisation and transnational historical bloc

There are many perspectives on globalisation and also many perspectives on the nature of state. There are scholars talking about the twilight of state and scholars that argue for a process of internationalization rather than globalisation, and consequently putting the state in the middle of this process. In this research, I will assume that globalisation implies the reorganisation of the state-society relations. For example, neoliberalism implies the shift from

¹⁷ See Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press. New York: 2005, p. 10.

¹⁸ See Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press. New York: 2005, pp. 10-11.

¹⁹ “Efficiency and price stability are the new priorities, the privatisation of the state-controlled enterprises and the liberalisation and deregulation of the economy at the national level are advocated, social peace is imposed rather than negotiated and there is no commitment to redistribution or social reform” (Bieler 2000, 22).

welfare state (the age of Keynesianism) to the night watchman state. “The institutions linked to the global economy have become dominant²⁰ within the ‘political society’ and transnational social forces dominate important parts of the ‘civil society’ such as political parties, trade unions and so on. Nationalised industry is privatised, the economy in general liberalised and deregulated, including the labour market, and the welfare system cut back. The goal of full employment is replaced by low inflation and price stability” (Bieler 2000, 24). But those theoretical assumptions cannot be applied for all states to the same extent. There are states that were not welfare, and there are states that did not totally become night-watchman. The reality is that neoliberal restructuring has a different face in every country, but the neoliberal night-watchman state is seen as an ideal type that would eventually indicate the direction of reforms.

Another important discussion here is about the existence of a transnational historical bloc, considering that Gramsci developed this concept only to be applied on a national level. The economic reality brought by globalisation through the internationalization of production raises the question if we can also talk about a historical bloc on a transnational level. Thus, Robert Cox identifies here two kinds of capitalist and labour organization. Regarding the definition of former bourgeoisie, Cox states that now we can talk about national capitalists and about a transnational class. The last one, that is the central point in my research, has its own ideology, strategy and institutions, and is also organised through Trilateral Commission, World Bank or International Monetary Fund²¹. On the other hand, the Canadian author argues that the stable workers from the international production sector are likely to be the ally of the transnational capitalist class²². Consequently, the nature of the transnational economy allows a broader discussion on the existence of a transnational historical bloc.

Following the research of Robert Cox, Stephen Gill argues that “a transnational historical bloc is outlined, with its nucleus largely comprising elements of the G-7 state apparatuses and transnational capital (in manufacturing, finance, and services), and associated privileged workers and smaller firms (e.g., small and middle-sized businesses linked as contractors or suppliers, import-export businesses, and service companies, such as stockbrokers, accountants, consultancies, lobbyists, educational entrepreneurs, architects, and designers)” (Gill 1995, 400-401). Furthermore, the existence of a transnational historical bloc automatically raises the question regarding its nature, if it is or not hegemonic. The most relevant research here was made also by Stephen Gill who states that the historical bloc did not reach the level of hegemony, and it is only in a position of supremacy²³. A deep discussion on this topic is not, however, important for this article.

2.2. Globalization and its impact on European Union

Following Andreas Bieler definition of globalisation, one could observe that this is a relatively new process that characterises the structural changes the world has experienced since 1970/1980. It involves the restructuring of states and the reconfiguration of social forces. “Global in its nature, this structural change has not left the EU unaffected. As elsewhere, globalisation has led to a transnational restructuring of social relations. The deregulation of national financial markets was institutionalised in the Internal Market programme, which stated that all remaining capital controls of member states had to be abolished by 1 July 1990”

²⁰ The process of national policy harmonization on the behalf of globalization process appears to Cox in contradiction with the Keynesian model of development, specific to the previous era. “The internationalization of state gives precedence to certain state agencies – notably ministries of finance and prime ministers’ offices – which are key points in the adjustment of domestic to international economic policy” (Cox, Robert. *Social Forces, States, and World Orders* in Keohane 1986, 231).

²¹ For more information see Cox, Robert. *Social Forces, States, and World Orders* in Keohane 1986, 233.

²² For more information see Cox, Robert. *Social Forces, States, and World Orders* in Keohane 1986, 235.

²³ For more details see Gill, Stephen. ‘Globalisation, Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, *Millennium*, 24: 1995, p. 400.

(Bieler 2000, 26). Thus, in this section I will focus on the configuration of social forces at European level, more exactly on the activity of the European Round Table of Industrialists, and on the Economic and Monetary Union, as a structural change generated by the globalisation process and the pressure of ERT.

2.2.1. European Round Table of Industrialists

I will discuss the configuration of social forces on European level in the context of an existing transnational historical bloc, constituted from the world's biggest transnational corporations, that has its representation in Europe through European Round Table of Industrialists. The transnational historical bloc could be observed in the context of the international policy-making apparatus that intensively collaborate with private agents: "for example, International Relations Councils such as the Trilateral Commission (which has a large EU membership, with elite political and economic interests represented), the World Economic Forum, the Group of Thirty (particularly important in money and finance), and think tanks such as the UK's Institute of Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith Institute, the American Brookings Institute and the American Enterprise Institute, as well as the fora for leaders of large corporations. It involves European fora associated with corporate influence on the making of public policy, such as the ERT which involves among its membership 20 of the top 100 firms in the world, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's World Investment Report of 1995" (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 54). Due the globalisation process, and implicitly due the transnationalisation of production and finance, the world biggest transnational corporations started to have more and more influence into the international policy-making process, steering it on a neoliberal road.

Going back to the transnational historical bloc basis in European Union, I should mention that it includes "state interests associated with the German-dominated unification project, large-scale finance and productive capital of global reach, as well as European companies, and associated privileged workers and smaller firms" (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 54). The real impact of the big capital on European integration is going to be deeply discussed in the next section of the paper, when I will try to show that it was the result of the large firms' pressure and it is also constituted on a neoliberal logic. Furthermore, "the concept of historical bloc enables us to understand how the present political formations, based on the dominance of transnational capital, are also constituted by and incorporate a wider range of interests and identities, including many privileged workers, members of the professions and small business people" (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 55). It is to say that transnational historical blocs include interests of both capital and labour, and they also strongly support the neoliberal restructuring of the European Union.

To show how all of those things became possible, I will present now the emergence and the influence of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) which is considered to be the central point of the European reform process. Thus, "When integration was at a low-point in the early 1980s and growing global competition threatened the position of large section of European industry, leading members of Europe's business community such as Pehr Gyllenhammar of Volvo, Umberto Agnelli of Fiat and Wisse Dekker of Philips, began to perceive the need for a European-level political initiative to recover from this European decline" (van Apeldoorn 2002, 84). This period when Europe faced a stagnation of the integration process, known also as the "Eurosclerosis", was overlapping with the crisis of Keynesianism and has raised a lot of questions regarding the future of European Union.

“The trouble was that the European economy was floundering and political leaders did not seem to understand why. Business leaders, on the other hand, had clear and (as ever) simple ideas²⁴” (Richardson 2000, 6). At that time, the European economy was similar in size to the one of the United States, but it was suffering from bad policies according to global economic realities and fragmentation²⁵. The ERT came as an answer to those problems brought by globalisation and it “developed a number of major themes to support these ideas. One was the need for adequate infrastructure links (roads, high speed trains and a Channel Tunnel) between different European countries to match the growth in cross-frontier trade and movement” (Richardson 2000, 6). Another idea, which will be further discussed in this article, was the building of a single internal market – like in the United States – where goods, capital and services can freely travel through the former borders of the member states. “A third was to tackle the intolerable “black cloud” of unemployment by policy measures to strengthen and dynamise European industry, through freeing up labour markets, raising levels of skills, encouraging entrepreneurship and stimulating an economic growth rich in the creation of new jobs” (Richardson 2000, 6). This is going to be known as the neoliberal reform of the European Union.

In time, ERT has developed and became an independent and very influential organisation recognised by both European institutions and member states’ national governments. Nowadays, the ERT has 52 members and its president is Leif Johansson, from the Ericsson. Since its beginnings, around 30 years ago, the number of members didn’t grow too much which means that ERT is still a select club. “The membership of the ERT is personal, it is not companies that are members of the ERT but individuals leading companies – in practice always *men* (the ERT has not so far had any female members). The Roundtable is therefore not a conference of transnational corporation meeting to discuss possible forms of co-operation or common strategies, but a group of individual businessmen who, although they are heads of certain TNCs, do not necessarily represent those companies within the Roundtable discussions. Membership is by invitation only” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 89). Thus, to achieve membership in the ERT supposes strong personal relationships with wider networks of economic elites. The selection of the members should respect a set of informal criteria.

“A first criterion is that the company which the prospective members are drawn must be a European-based (industrial) TNC, preferably private. The prospective members should ‘represent’ their company at the highest level, that of chairman or chief executive officer (CEO). The company itself should also be independent and not a subsidiary” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 89). Besides this, the company should also have its headquarter somewhere in Europe, fact which makes the accession impossible for the leaders of many companies with the headquarter in United States. Another important criterion “is that the prospective member not only shares the (official) objectives of the Roundtable but can make a credible commitment that he will contribute to the achievement of those objectives. As the membership is personal, the choice is also made on a basis of personal characteristics, where personality, opinions [of the person], capabilities and vision, all play a role” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 90). Consequently, the political view of each candidate has a strong importance and it should be similar with the one of current members.

²⁴ The closure between big business and decision makers was coming from both sides. On the one hand the Europeans TNCs were seeing their profits threaten by the global economic realities (transnationalisation of production), and on the other hand, political decision makers wanted to listen to the preferences of the big companies regarding reform policies: *Who do we talk to when we want to talk to European industry?* This was the question raised by the two leading European Commissioners, Etienne Davignon and François-Xavier Ortoli (Richardson 2000, 6) which I consider very important for this research.

²⁵ “The European Union (to use its later title) did not function as a single economic unit, which was the fundamental advantage of the US, and its economic management was out of date and in many respects counterproductive” (Richardson 2000, 6).

Moving forward from the structural characteristics of the ERT, I will move now to the nature of this entity. “Many of the 500 or more Euro-organisations represent specific business interests. The overwhelming majority of these are sectoral of trade associations” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 102). Also, it must be said that in the sector of industry there are six big associations of business: UNICE; Eurochambres; the European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP); the European Community Services Group; the EC Committee of an American Chamber of Commerce (Amcham); and the ERT (van Apeldoorn 2002, 102). According to van Apeldoorn, “the ERT takes up a unique place within this group, and indeed within the whole system of business interest representation” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 102). If we look also on the European official web site, it indicates also that the “ERT has close contacts with *BUSINESSEUROPE*, the official representative body of European business and industry vis-à-vis the European institutions”²⁶. Thereby, the European Roundtable forum is not a lobby group itself, but it is working through other lobby groups.

“The agency of the ERT, then, falls neither under the logic of pluralist lobbying nor under that of corporatist interest intermediation. Thus whereas for instance UNICE, as a peak association, has a public and formal – one might say ‘corporatist’ – role to play vis-à-vis the Commission and as a ‘social partner’ in the dialogue with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the ERT is not an interest association at all” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 104). To be more specific, the ERT has no members to represent or to discipline, but the ERT is its members. Thus, van Apeldoorn argues that it is “neither a lobby group nor an association, but rather a private forum for Europe’s transnational capitalist class” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 101).

The main argument here is that “because the ERT is not a formal interest association, but rather a relatively informal elite club of Europe’s most prominent business leaders, it can formulate and propagate a concept of the general (capitalist) interest, which [...] is always formulated from the vantage point of a particular class *fraction*” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 106). It seems also very natural that capitalist interests are constructed through a business forum like ERT, where the leading capitalists come together and share ideas, trying to reach a common view on issues like labour or state (van Apeldoorn 2002, 106). Moreover, those ideas are gathered in some strategies that will become public and set the agenda of policy makers. Van Apeldoorn calls this a transnational class strategy.

The ERT has different ways to communicate their ideas. “It regularly publishes reports either on specific themes or of a more comprehensive nature, and frequently sends letters and communiques to individual politicians or to collective bodies such as the European Council” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 113). But the most usual and efficient way to communicate is face to face, during the meetings between CEO’s of the ERT and decision and policy makers. The most important proposals regarding the European economic efficiency made by ERT were gathered under the issue of *Competitiveness*. “ERT staff worked in close liaison with the Commission, ERT ideas were evident in the Delors White Paper on Competitiveness, Growth and Employment, and also in the parallel Action Plan issued by the Brussels European Council in 1993, while the Essen European Council in 1994 formally endorsed the ERT proposal for a high level Competitiveness Advisory Group with powers to lay relevant issues directly before heads of government as well as the President of the Commission” (Richardson 2000, 8). Besides competitiveness, there are also other working groups that are meant to provide an integrated view on European economy: CFO Task Force²⁷, Competition Policy²⁸,

²⁶ For more details, see Erawatch - Platform on Research and Innovation policies and systems on: [http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu\[...\]](http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu[...]).

²⁷ “The ERT CFO Task Force seeks to address matters particularly in the development of financial and regulatory reporting. They engage with regulators including the IASB, the European Commission and corporate groups, to address key concerns and to communicate to governments and regulators the positions that are in the interest of and agreed on behalf of ERT Members” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups).

Energy & Climate Change²⁹, Societal Changes³⁰ and Trade and Market Access³¹. Moreover, the ERT members were involved in the “debate on the proposed European Company Statute and other social legislation, gave continuing support to Monetary Union, argued for the adoption of international accounting standards, helped to launch the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, pushed hard and in the end successfully for a world trade agreement” (Richardson 2000, 8).

Thus, following Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson or many other scholars, one could say that the ERT “played a major role in the emergence of the Single European Act (SEA) and the creation of the 1992 single market programme” (Mazey and Richardson 2001). Those reforms remain some of the most important changes that the European Community managed to follow because of their impact in reforming an entire continent in the next twenty years. “While political pundits and journalists evaluate the achievements and shortcomings of the 1992 project, scholars continue to wage a considerable debate over the origins of the single market programme and the accompanying SEA. At the core of this academic dispute is the question of the role played by the leaders of big business and their influence on the policy-making process³²” (Cowles 1995, 502).

On the other hand, van Apeldoorn interprets the re-launching of the European integration through the internal market programme, Single European Act and Treaty of Maastricht in terms of a struggle between two main contenting projects. “The struggle between the two most important of these projects – those of neoliberalism and neo-mercantilism – was partly manifested within the ranks of the European Roundtable, which at the same time also played a crucial role in shaping this struggle” (van Apeldoorn 2002, 115). Neo-mercantilism was specific for the Keynesian period of welfare state and national protectionism, while neoliberalism came, as I already argued, as a component of globalisation process (besides transnationalisation of production and finance) and involves the economic liberalisation and the minimisation of the state interventionism. “Van Apeldoorn shows how the ERT shifted from a perspective that sought to encourage the development of European champions (an inward-looking and defensive Euro-mercantilist strategy), to a more neo-liberal and global orientation during the 1990s. During the early 1980s, most firms that were the national and European ‘champions’ generally tended to perceive globalisation as a threat rather than as an opportunity and pressed for a relaunch of the European project on very different terms to neo-liberals” (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 53). In this context, neoliberalism appears to be a project of globally-oriented finance and industrial capital that is certainly going to benefit from globalisation, rather than a project of the European companies who produce for the European markets.

²⁸ “ERT believes that globalisation, rapid technological change and market dynamism are intensifying competition in EU markets and worldwide. EU competition policy, which is central to the proper functioning of the internal market, should therefore be adopted to the global economy, and made fit for dynamic markets” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups).

²⁹ “The Energy and Climate Change Working Group seeks to create a holistic approach appropriate to the international context to address the significant challenges that Europe and the planet are confronting” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups).

³⁰ “The Societal Changes Working Group is focused on issues that pertain to Europe’s greatest resource: its people. The future of Europe and its industries depends on the workforce of today and tomorrow” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups).

³¹ “ERT believes that open international flows of trade and investment are a crucial component in ensuring European companies’ competitiveness in a global economy; and necessary for achieving balanced global growth. The Trade and Market Access Working Group focuses on the prospect of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” (http://www.ert.eu/working_groups).

³² “Reshaping Europe had much to say on the details of the “competitive market place” and the infrastructure needed for business efficiency. It emphasised the two-way relationship: “Europe needs its industries...but industry also needs Europe”, and it boldly mapped out a comprehensive timetable for Monetary Union at a time when decision makers were still hesitating” (Richardson 2000, 7).

2.2.2. European Monetary Union

European integration can neither be simply derived from structural developments nor from highly abstract concepts and ideas developed at the drawing table. Instead, it takes place as a 'succession of negotiated settlements' (Bieling 2003, 206). In this section I will try to argue that, considering the pressure of the ERT through lobby activity and policy initiatives, that Maastricht reforms and the Economic and Monetary Union are encompassed into the neoliberal discourse. It means that EMU is a result of the globalisation pressure on the one hand, and a specific political project developed by the decision makers in collaboration with representative of European big capital (ERT) on the other.

Moreover, Stephen Gill's suggestion is to see EMU in the context of economic global regionalisation which is a phenomena that can also be seen in North America or East Asia. "Thus it is important to place EMU (and other liberalization measures in the EU) in the context of global patterns of power and production, as aspects of the political economy of globalisation. The emerging accumulation patterns are linked to the rising power of internationally mobile capital" (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 48-49). This is just a tendency of capitalism system to centralise and concentrate capital that has been observed and predicted even by Karl Marx in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus, the Maastricht reforms were a political reaction in front of all this developments. "They seek to institutionalise a new currency and mandate strict fiscal discipline as part of the new practices of economic governance that will give credibility to governments and confidence to investors. It is part of an expansion of state activity to provide greater legal and other protections for business, and to try to stabilise the investment climate in Europe³³" (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 49).

For Christoph Hermann, the EMU is one of the most obvious and clear manifestation of neoliberal reforms at the European level. "While the SEA guarantees "free" trade and capital mobility within Europe, the EMU fortifies the principles of monetary restraint and budgetary austerity by forcing EMU member states in to a tight fiscal corset. [...] The budgetary constraints imposed by the convergence criteria also compel member states to introduce far-reaching reforms in labour and social policies as their ability to confront unemployment and social exclusion is severely limited by the lack of budgetary funds" (Hermann 2007, 14-15). Besides the national level, the European Commission is also promoting price stability and fiscal austerity in the name of economic growth.

The neoliberal design of EMU was well express by the Thomas Palley, who discusses it from a Keynesian point of view and states that the neoliberal reforms were the core of the nowadays European financial crisis. He argues that "the flawed European-wide policy concerns the neoliberal labour market and macroeconomic policy strategy that has been persistently promoted since the early 1980s. The flawed German policy concerns Germany's reliance on export-led growth based on domestic wage suppression. The combination of flawed policy plus flawed design explains how the crisis came about; why existing policy has been incapable of addressing the crisis; and why the future promises on-going economic crisis absent reform of the eurozone's economic policy configuration and monetary architecture" (Palley 2013, 31). Furthermore, the neoliberal dimension could be seen in the convergence criteria to the eurozone, which are macroeconomic indicators measuring price stability (to see if the inflation is under control), soundness and sustainability of public finances (to check the limits on government borrowing and national debt to avoid excessive deficit), exchange-

³³ Also, "European governments have sought to expand the scope of free enterprise as the primary motor of accumulation, and to de-socialise risk provision. In this way they are changing the institutional balance between state and civil society (e.g., through privatisation in pensions, health, education)" (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 49).

rate stability and long-term interest rates (to assess the durability of the convergence achieved by fulfilling the other criteria)³⁴. Thus, “fiscal consolidation for the purpose of meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria was largely achieved through reduced interest payments, caused by reduced risk premiums that could be ‘imported’ to previous high inflation countries from the low inflation countries in the EMU core through the common currency backed by the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact³⁵” (Ryner, Magnus. *Neoliberal European Governance and the Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment: A Critique of the New Malthusians* in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 50).

Turning back to Stephen Gill, he named the European political economy as an Achilles’ heel due the effects of the neoliberal monetarist austerity policies: mass unemployment. “Concentrated heavily among younger and less skilled workers, it partly explains tough immigration and asylum policies and, at least for the movement of (most) people, a ‘fortress Europe’. It contributes to a potent admixture of social and economic dislocation, physical risks, racism and xenophobia” (Gill, Stephen. *Constitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-Liberalism* in Bieler and Morton 2001, 48). Consequently, the EMU reforms designed a Europe for the TNCs, where the economic freedom stays in front of the social protection of the citizens.

3. Conclusions

What is the relation between globalization and the process of European integration? Does European integration have its own way, or it is deeply dependent on globalization? Those are the research questions that I tried to follow in this article, and I tried to answer them by discussing the European integration from a neo-gramscian perspective and then, by finding a proper definition for the concept of globalisation. What I found out was that the most important component of the neo-gramscian approach was their focus on the social forces agency. Social forces were no more than faction of the social classes that couldn’t reach a high level of cohesion not even in nowadays society. Moreover, economic realities of the present, show a high degree a capital concentration on global level, so we can talk about transnational social forces, which are in fact Transnational Corporations that operate on a global scale. The fact that we can use social forces in analysing European integration means that we could encompass also the globalisation process.

Furthermore, I understood globalisation, following Andreas Bieler and Robert Cox, as a process of transnationalisation of production, transnationalisation of finance and the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. Consequently, production and finance are deeply connected with the activity of the TNCs, while neoliberal ideology works at the hegemonic level. People begin to perceive the neoliberal economic reality as the only possible reality that works for the benefit of all. Thereby, those forces engendered by the globalisation process achieved a certain level of cohesion at the European level and form the European Round Table of Industrialists – a forum where the capitalist class strategy is formed. Going forward with my research, I found out that the ERT had a very important role in the reforming European Union through the Single European Act, Treaty of Maastricht and Economic and Monetary Union. In the end, I focused on the EMU and I showed how its institutional architecture and policies outputs were encompassed in the neoliberal perspective.

³⁴European Commission. Economic and Financial Affairs: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/adoption/who_can_join/index_en.htm.

³⁵ “This even had positive demand side-effects via decreasing interest rates. In addition, fiscal consolidation was largely secured on the revenue side. True, corporate taxation rates and employers’ contributions were reduced. However, tighter writeoff rules for corporate taxes, and the switching from payroll surcharges to general taxation, increased the tax base” (Ryner, Magnus. *Neoliberal European Governance and the Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment: A Critique of the New Malthusians* in van Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil and Horn 2009, 50).

To conclude, the processes of globalisation and European Integration are deeply connected and represent, in neo-gramscian terms, both the tendency of capital concentration and the influence of the neoliberal ideology. Thus, due the economic and ideological reasons, European integration follows the same path as globalisation and seems to be, for the regular citizen, impossible to control through the representative democracy.

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