

# EXPORTING ECONOMIC SECURITY TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION: EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD IN CONTRAST TO SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN

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## Abstract

*A prosperous neighbourhood for a developing country is an undeniable fact. Among most eloquent examples serves the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that is subject of large debates. In this context, we are used to get knowledge about the benefits that the ENP brings to Eastern and Southern Mediterranean partners. On the other hand, many studies criticize the European Union (EU) foreign policy as presenting weak incentives and conditionality. Nevertheless, this situation requires from our point of view a thorough analysis about the share of economic security that is "imported" by the EU due to the ENP implementation in its immediate vicinity. Thereby, an empirical analysis is going to be carried out in this article where the manoeuvre with some statistic data and macroeconomic indicators within economic security typologies is expected to generate useful insights in order to identify: Who generates more economic security gains for the EU? In more details, tracing the analytic parallel between economic measures within the European Neighbourhood Policy and contemporary approach to economic security, namely according to the European vision of security it enables the author to reach conclusions which of the EU's neighbours show more economic certainty and security. If this correlation generates positive results, then the author will assert that the EU offer regarding the Neighbourhood Policy is prospective for recipients but also for the EU in terms of economic security "import".*

**Keywords:** *European Neighbourhood Policy, economic security, Eastern partners, Southern Mediterranean partners*

## I. Introduction

The main scope of this study is to exhibit at some extent how much economic security the Southern and Eastern ENP partners export towards the EU (the author will interpret results obtained via the quantitative method of research and security itself is difficult to quantify). This in fact could resolve a number of questions related to "prosperity generating"<sup>1</sup> in the European surroundings.<sup>2</sup>

Taking it step by step, firstly, the author chooses to work more on economic dimension of the ENP because from the very beginning and namely from the origins of the ENP, "interconnecting the neighbourhood in terms of trade and political relations, energy, infrastructure, and telecommunication networks" was somehow left on the second plan<sup>3</sup>.

In this vain, regarding the economic policy coordination, the EU tends to be honest and fair to all its partners in the neighbourhood, but it is quite complicated to equally provide incentives and economic security techniques to all. Among others, Delcour concludes about EU's difficult ability to respond to several challenges from the neighbourhood that differently perceives the EU foreign policy intentions and neighbour countries necessarily have their own preferences for cooperation and foreign policy<sup>4</sup>. In addition, Delcour mentions about some actions at regional level (in its work –

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<sup>1</sup> Christopher M. Dent, "Economic Security," in *Contemporary Security Studies*, ed. Alan Collins (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 204-221.

<sup>2</sup> Having the ENP agenda and neighbourhood economic and political realities, the whole process looks like the proverb: "And the wolf replete and the sheep unharmed".

<sup>3</sup> Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?" *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 26.

<sup>4</sup> Laure Delcour, "The European Union, a security provider in the Eastern neighbourhood?" *European Security* 19:4 (December 2010): 545.

Eastern ENP partners) concerning the achievement of the security objectives to / from the neighbourhood<sup>5</sup>. Thus, in the present article it is focused on the economic security that can be provided by the ENP partners at least at regional level, author working by contrast.

Generally, this study will be performed by quantitative and qualitative research methods. Therefore, to argue what neighbourhood is more secure for the EU and presents more economic security prospects in general, the author will manoeuvre with statistical data and here the interpretation of result will be performed in qualitative terms. Besides, in order to find *Quo Vadis* the EU – Neighbourhood “marriage”, the present study will provide a snapshot of economic security in the neighbourhood not at individual level but at regional level, connecting the retrospective aspects related to the EU security with some prospects. In addition, working with macroeconomic indicators (retrieved from the World Bank (WB) database) and data from international rankings it will be calculated a regional average value that will illustrate by contrast the regional economic capacity, the state of economic security and chances to penetrate one of the largest global markets – the EU market.

Speaking about qualitative method, two important moments the author highlights: firstly, by revealing the economic difference between these two camps (Eastern and Southern ENP partners) it will explain the result of this research purpose; secondly, it has to be established towards what the EU aspires in its surroundings. Thus for this purpose, to “play” with retrospective/prospective objectives it will be used a method of analysis (a schematic representation) not very common for the literature body on European Studies, this in turn injects novelty in this analysis. The TRIZ (Theory of inventive problem solving) theory<sup>6</sup> will be used.

In order to clarify the reader, an important remark follows: the author is not actually going to start with the economic security conceptualisation because “definitions of economic security are in themselves dependent on perceptions and values”<sup>7</sup>.

One can be concluded that this comparative analysis is one more contribution to put in light the EU’s external policy vectors and assistance trajectory towards its neighbourhood.

## **II. Two camps: different approaches and different interests**

Whereas the EU external actions and foreign policy is mainly based on security purposes in its surroundings, therefore it could be reiterated that the security and the ENP go in pair<sup>8</sup>. Besides, the economic dimension of the ENP and of security is also strongly interconnected mainly from the retrospective point of view – among main cornerstones of the Union’s formation are economic interferences. In this context, for the EU neighbourhood, a real boom was the widening good vicinity’s relations and the launch of the ENP among “different countries” and “common interests”<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, above everything, there were created two trajectories of economic policy coordination in the South and in the East: each of them benefiting of Barcelona Process<sup>10</sup> (which shortcomings

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 535-49.

<sup>6</sup> See Michael A. Orloff, *Inventive Thinking Through TRIZ: A Practical Guide*. Second Edition (London: Springer, 2006) and *Open Source TRIZ*, accessed January 12, 2013.

[http://www.opensourcetriz.com/main/page\\_collaborators.html](http://www.opensourcetriz.com/main/page_collaborators.html).

<sup>7</sup> Wolfgang Hager, “Defining Economic Security,” in *National economic security: perceptions, threats and policies*, ed. Frans Alphons Maria Alting Von Geusau and Gunnar Adler-Karlsson (Tilburg: Transaction Publishers, 1982), 21.

<sup>8</sup> See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, Brussels, 11.3.2003, COM(2003) 104 final.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>10</sup> European Union. *European Union External Action. The Barcelona Process*, accessed February 10, 2013, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euomed/barcelona\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euomed/barcelona_en.htm).

related to economic reform winnow the connection between economic measures for the partners and economic domestic interests of the EU<sup>11</sup>) or Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)<sup>12</sup>. And in this context, the author agrees with the fact that “the ENP corrects a number of deficiencies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”<sup>13</sup> and also asserts that it is without any doubt that at the same extent the ENP also „corrects” the PCA.

Turning to the significant body of literature, the „contrast” between the South and Eastern partners was obvious from the very beginning. For instance, Del Sarto and Schumacher consider that Eastern partners were sceptical concerning the new ENP because the last considered this new foreign EU policy as a delay regarding the EU membership, instead of Mediterranean Southern partners that were much enthusiastic about the ENP<sup>14</sup>.

Taking the other side of the coin and namely the EU interest, Marchetti underlines the EU “preference” rather towards the Eastern neighbours instead of Mediterranean.<sup>15</sup> In reality, the EU entered into dialogue with two different camps where some of them are strained by frozen conflicts and others strangled by “political and religious extremism”<sup>16</sup> but the both present weak capacity for democracy building. For this reason, the EU could fall in a kind of foreign policy hysteresis because it is difficult to maintain the “balanced approach” in these conditions of continuous economic and political challenges. Besides, EU member states and especially those that border the Southern and Eastern vicinity present very different economic and political interests<sup>17</sup>.

Regarding the financial assistance, Longhurts has calculated and resumed that the Southern ENP partners benefit and “consume” more than the Eastern in a ratio of 2 : 1<sup>18</sup>. Same author identified that “the top recipients are Palestinian Authority, Republic of Moldova (henceforth: Moldova) and Lebanon”<sup>19</sup>. Regarding the “EU’s principal method” and “long - term vision of relationships”, Longhurts exhaustively draws a comparative table and delimitates that for the South, the EU undertakes a regional approach in contrast to the East that takes advantage of a bilateral approach “with small elements of sub-regionalism”<sup>20</sup>. In economic prospects, the EU – Southern ENP equation of economic relations look for deep relations in comparison with the EU – Eastern ENP that tends to deep free trade<sup>21</sup>. Is it the problem in the geo-economic organisation of these two neighbourhoods? Among others, Missiroli proposed their regroupation in “(sub-) regional “clusters””<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> Diana Hunt, “Development Economics, The Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative,” in *Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, ed. George Joffe (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 16-7.

<sup>12</sup> *Europa*, Summaries of EU legislation, “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia” accessed February 4, 2013, [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/external\\_relations/relations\\_with\\_third\\_countries/eastern\\_europe\\_and\\_central\\_asia/r17002\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_central_asia/r17002_en.htm).

<sup>13</sup> Del Sarto and Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?” 28.

<sup>14</sup> Del Sarto and Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?” 30.

<sup>15</sup> Andreas Marchetti, “Consolidation in Times of Crisis: The European Neighbourhood Policy as Chance for Neighbours?” *European Political Economy Review* 7 (Summer 2007): 9 – 23.

<sup>16</sup> Kerry Longhurts, “Injecting More Differentiation in European Neighbourhood Policy: What Consequences for Ukraine?” *Institut français des relations internationales*. July 2008, accessed March 1, 2013, [www.ifri.org](http://www.ifri.org), 5.

<sup>17</sup> Barbara Lippert, “The Discussion on EU Neighborhood Policy – Concepts, Reform Proposals and National Positions,” *International Policy Analysis*, ed. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, July 2007, accessed: 28 February 2013, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04737.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Longhurts “Injecting More Differentiation in European Neighbourhood Policy: What Consequences for Ukraine?” 10.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>21</sup> See Longhurts’ compilation of information into Table 3, “Injecting More Differentiation in European Neighbourhood Policy: What Consequences for Ukraine?” 14.

<sup>22</sup> Antonio Missiroli, “The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilization, Integration and Partnership,” in *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, ed. Roland Dannreuther. (London: Routledge, 2004), 6.

Regarding the participation into European Single Market (ESM), Escribano identifies that most difficult is for the Southern Mediterranean<sup>23</sup> but meantime they accept to carry this cargo of the EU economic directives “partly in pure pragmatism”<sup>24</sup> and because the EU is “major source of economic aid”<sup>25</sup>. For a holistic justification and additional conclusions, the author of this study concentrates regional macroeconomic average data in the Chart that follow, thus a comparative analysis is conducted. On the other side, some EU member states that “run the risk of losing their comparative advantages in certain economic sectors”<sup>26</sup> look rather to increase the aid instead of deep trade relations<sup>27</sup>. This is a kind of safeguarding the domestic market from the part of the EU members that share borders with its Southern and Eastern partners. For the last both actors this is a threat because they easily become “good consumers of foreign aids” and do not develop the capacity for self-development and export-oriented economic growth.

Another token that divides the EU from its neighbourhood it is the real interest. Therefore, “the EU is obviously first and foremost interested in securing *itself*”<sup>28</sup> By contrast, the neighbourhood look for more aid and market integration. Besides, the Eastern group has as declared objective the EU membership<sup>29</sup>. In addition to the last, the author would like to exemplify by Moldova. Thus, mass media often vehiculates with the idea that moldovan citizens and decision and policy – makers wants to “fall into the EU canvas” mainly for visa liberalization. Contrary to the above said, the author considers that this is thought by people that many years ago emmigrated to the EU instead of people who remained in Moldova, those who have a pro-European vision and who in economic terms look for European standards, quality and capabilities to protect their markets and values.

Missiroli points that the EU through Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) had more economic interest towards Eastern partners in contrast to the Mediterranean<sup>30</sup>. Nevertheless in order to reduce economic disparities at regional level it is difficult to find one general aplicable formula for all economies and meanwhile respect the principle of differentiation.

Table 1 illustrates the following situation: the ENP seems to be dissonant with economic realities of EU neighbours. Apart from the case that both Southern and Eastern ENP partners in average terms are “Partly Free”<sup>31</sup> they also do not enjoy too much perception of corruption. Only Israel and Georgia present capacity to fight againts corruption (Table 1). For the rest of partners as well as for the EU this is a threat to internal market and affect the cooperation with prospective trade partners. The Human Development Index (HDI) however reflects that the Southern and Eastern ENP partners present capacity for development and modernisation and a relative good life quality. On the other hand, according to the Failed State Index 2012 the EU member states are positioned in the categories of “Moderate” and “Sustainable” states while its neighbourhood really presents worrying signs<sup>32</sup>. For instance, in “Alert” are Syria and Egypt and the rest of Mediterranean and Eastern

<sup>23</sup> Gonzalo Escribano, “Europeanisation without Europe? The Mediterranean and the Neighbourhood Policy”. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Mediterranean Programme Series, 2006, accessed January 12, 2013, [http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/06\\_19.pdf](http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/06_19.pdf), 15.

<sup>24</sup> Hunt, “Development Economics, The Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative,” 16.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Del Sarto and Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?” 32.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Del Sarto and Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?” 28.

<sup>29</sup> Adept and Expert-Grup, *EU-Republic of Moldova Action Plan: Guide* (Chisinau: Guvina Press, 2006).

<sup>30</sup> Missiroli, “The EU and its Changing Neighbourhood: Stabilization, Integration and Partnership”.

<sup>31</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2012*. 2012, accessed March 2, 2013, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>.

<sup>32</sup> Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index 2012*, accessed March 4, 2013, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed\\_states\\_index\\_2012\\_interactive](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive).

partners are in “Warning” situation meeting issues related to “economic decline”, “uneven development” and “weak security apparatus”<sup>33</sup>. Hereby, towards EU, both partners “export” rather insecurity than security and for this reason EU emphasize the cross-border cooperation and developed the new principle-incentive of “more for more”<sup>34</sup>. Nevertheless, the European Commission reached the conclusion that “despite a difficult context, the EU has been able to establish a partnership for reform with its neighbours”<sup>35</sup>. This is the EU modality of securitisation because “economic security requires more than just maximizing current economic prosperity”<sup>36</sup> it exits its capabilities, models of governance and assistance outside its borders thinking on stable economic surroundings. Therefore, the author believes that the EU at least has the moral right to establish the rules of economic integration in its surrounding even risking with internal disputes among Member States and despite present conditions of financial crisis it continues assisting the neighbourhood’s impoverished economies.

**Table 1: Southern and Eastern ENP partners in the global ranking.**

Index/ Country <sup>37</sup>	Failed State Index		Global Competitiveness Report 2012- 2013 <sup>38</sup>		Freedom Report 2012 <sup>39</sup>		Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2012 <sup>40</sup>		Human Development Index (HDI) 2011 <sup>41</sup>	
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Freedom Rating	Status	Rank	Score	Index	Category
<b>EU’s Southern Partners</b>										
Algeria	77	78.1	110	3.72	5.5	Not free	105	34	0.696	Medium
Egypt	31	90.4	107	3.73	5.5	Not free	118	32	0.644	Medium
Israel	61	82.2	26	5.02	1.5	Free	39	60	0.888	Very High
Jordan	90	74.8	64	4.23	5.5	Not free	58	48	0.698	Medium
Lebanon	45	85.8	91	3.88	4.5	Partly free	128	30	0.739	High
Libya	50	84.9	113	3.68	6.5	Not free	160	21	0.760	High
Morocco	87	76.1	70	4.15	4.5	Partly free	88	37	0.582	Medium

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> European Commission, “Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy” *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*, Brussels, 15. 5. 2012, JOIN(2012) 14 final.

<sup>35</sup> European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. *Tacking stock of European Neighbourhood Policy*, Brussels, 12. 5. 2010. COM (2010) 207, 14.

<sup>36</sup> Carl R. Neu and Charles Wolf Jr., *The Economic Dimensions of National Security* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), xii.

<sup>37</sup> There are no data available for the Palestinian Authority.

<sup>38</sup> Klaus Schwab, *Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013*, accessed March 4, 2013, [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\\_GlobalCompetitivenessReport\\_2012-13.pdf](http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2012-13.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2012*.

<sup>40</sup> Transparency International, *Corruption Perception Index 2012*, accessed March 4, 2013, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>.

<sup>41</sup> UNDP, *Human Development Index 2011*, accessed March 4, 2013, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

Occupied Palestinian territory	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.641	Medium
Syria <sup>42</sup>	23	94.5	-	-	7	Not free	144	26	0.632	Medium
Tunisia <sup>43</sup>	94	74.2	-	-	3.5	Partly free	75	41	0.698	High
<b>Average score</b>	-	<b>82.3</b>		<b>4,06</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>Partly Free</b>	-	<b>36.5</b>		<b>Predominantly Medium</b>
<b>EU's Eastern Partners</b>										
Armenia	102	72.2	82	4.02	5	Partly Free	105	34	0.716	High
Azerbaijan	68	79.8	46	4.41	5.5	Not free	139	27	0.731	High
Belarus	85	76.6	-	-	6.5	Not free	123	31	0.756	High
Georgia	51	84.8	77	4.07	3.5	Partly free	51	52	0.733	High
Moldova	73	78.7	87	3.94	3	Partly free	94	36	0.649	Medium
Ukraine	113	67.2	73	4.14	3.5	Partly free	144	26	0.729	High
<b>Average score</b>	-	<b>76.5</b>		<b>4.12</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>Partly free</b>		<b>34.3</b>		<b>Predominantly High</b>

The average score at regional level is calculated by author according to the data retrieved from the international rankings

Source: Data retrieved from Freedom House, Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, Schwab, Transparency International, UNDP and WB

### III. Eastern and Southern Mediterranean: harmony or discord with the EU (in macroeconomic trends)?

Contemporary security studies broaden foreign policy implications into security analysis and securitisation<sup>44</sup> whilst “the economics-security nexus”<sup>45</sup> receives new insights. For this study, the author is going to put face to face the cause that is designated to be the ENP and the effect which is security - the EU’s main objective (author analyses the economic dimension<sup>46</sup>). Thereby, matching the cause with the effect is going to be done upon the two camps (Eastern and Southern ENP

<sup>42</sup> No data related to *Global Competitiveness Report 2012- 2013* because of security issues. See Klaus Schwab, *Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013*.

<sup>43</sup> No data related to *Global Competitiveness Report 2012- 2013* because of “structural break in the data”. See Klaus Schwab, *Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013*.

<sup>44</sup> Alan Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).


<sup>45</sup> Dent, “Economic Security”, 206-207.

<sup>46</sup> See Michaela Dodini and Marco Fantini, “The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for economic growth and stability,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44:3 (2006): 507-32 and Commission of the European Communities, *European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission*, Brussels, 12. 5. 2004, COM (2004) 373 final, 2-35.

partners). In this order of ideas, if the ENP could be considered as “Foreign Economic Policy (FEP) power”, thus in perspective it should make the neighbours sustainable exporters of economic security ensuring both (EU and its Neighbourhood) “supply security”, “market access security”, “finance-credit security”, “techno-industrial capability security”, “socio-economic paradigm security”, “transborder community security”, “systemic security” and “alliance security”<sup>47</sup>.

Before starting the analysis it should be clarified towards what tends the EU. Thus, just to recapitulate the evolution of economic security on the European continent from cornerstones until present realities when we already speak about EU and its neighbourhood, author compiled the information in the Fig. 1, showing that the EU’s main objective of all times is security. Besides, as it was mentioned in the Introduction, this representation was performed according to the TRIZ method of problem solving because the author finds it is simple and easy to understand.

**Fig 1: The economic security of the EU with ENP implications**



Source: Author’s elaboration relying on the TRIZ theory<sup>48</sup> and Buzan<sup>49</sup>

Thereby, according to the Fig. 1 it can be observed a shift from European security retrospectives towards the prospects of Regional Economic Security (involving the EU economic security and the Neighbourhood Security). Likewise, the economic security of the EU is one central system that on the one hand it is the result of a “super-system” (EU security) and on the other hand, the ENP (with a sustainable economic mechanism) is the foreign policy that contributes to the EU

<sup>47</sup> Christopher M. Dent, “The state and transnational capital in adaptive partnership Singapore, Korea and Taiwan,” in *Handbook of Reaserch on Asian Business*, ed. Henry Wai - Chung Yeung (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), 228-229.

<sup>48</sup> This figure was performed according to Orloff’s explanation regarding the “Strategy of Inventing”, in Michael A. Orloff, *Inventive Thinking Through TRIZ: A Practical Guide*, Second Edition (London: Springer, 2006), 210. See also *Open Source TRIZ*, accessed January 12, 2013, [http://www.opensourcetriz.com/main/page\\_collaborators.html](http://www.opensourcetriz.com/main/page_collaborators.html).

<sup>49</sup> When mentioning about “consumer, producer and state security” see Barry Buzan, *People State and Fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

economic security. In perspective, the ENP will contribute to the market integration and the Free Trade Area and this in turn will be one of the factors that will contribute to the overall regional security, involving the EU security and the Southern and Eastern ENP partners' security.

At present, we can observe that foreign policy (above all the economic dimension) implications are broadened and this contributes to the EU economic security's objective achievements. Many years ago, great intention marked the security objective and namely the change of "the politics of exclusion" by "the politics of inclusion"<sup>50</sup> and then following deep transformations by replacing the "inside" with the "outside", the "self" with the "other" and "boundaries" with "borderlands", emphasising the "exchange" and the "interaction" and generating more dynamism for the Union<sup>51</sup>. In the future, it is aimed a secure area of economic integration and possibly with new designs of foreign economic policy.

Likewise, author believes that the formula EU economic security + Neighbourhood economic security is achievable if the EU and its neighbourhood economic efforts will be symmetric and honest.

For the last years, the experience of the ENP implementation showed that this policy brings noticeable benefits of economic nature and amongst them the wider access for products to the EU market through the Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP). In economic security terms this is a form of economic safeguarding for both the EU and its partners from the neighbourhood.


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<sup>50</sup> Michael Smith, "The European Union and a changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34:1 (1996): 5-28.

<sup>51</sup> Michele Comelli, Ettore Greco and Nathalie Tocci, *Working Paper: From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders in Europe through the European Neighbourhood Policy*. draft version. EU-CONSENT, July 31, 2006, accessed February 12, 2013, <http://www.eu-consent.net/content.asp?contentid=1095>, 3-19.




**Chart 1: Regional average values of the agriculture, values added (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 2: Regional average values of the industry, values added (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

Chart 3: Regional average values of the export of goods (% of GDP).




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

Chart 4: Regional average values of the import of goods (% of GDP).




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 5: Regional average values of the trade (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 6: Regional average values of the central government debt (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 7: Regional average values of the revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 8: Regional average values of the tax revenue (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 9: Regional average values of the military expenditures (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 10: Regional average values of the research and development (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 11: Regional average values of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), net inflows (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 12: Regional average values of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), net outflows (% of GDP).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 13: Regional average values of the inflation, consumer prices (% annual).**




Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 14: Regional average values of the unemployment, total (% of total labour force).**



Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

**Chart 13: Regional average values of the energy imports, net (% of energy use).**



Source: Author's elaboration. Data retrieved from the WB

The first four charts (Chart 1, Chart 2, Chart 3 and Chart 4) are interrelated and portray the following situation: the most important contribution regarding the agriculture, value added as % of GDP has Eastern ENP partners whilst in industry until 2008 the Southern ENP partners enjoyed success, but from 2009 predominate the Eastern ENP partners. According to WB data, it seems that in export terms the East enjoys more success in contrast to the South, excluding the year 2008 when the global financial crisis seriously affected the East and gave green light to the South due to Jordan, Libya and Tunisia, recording more than 50% of exports as % of GDP (Chart 3). However, it is difficult to say that the economic growth of the Eastern ENP partners is due to export – led model because the Chart 4 exhibits the following situations: the East overrun the South regarding the imports as % of GDP where the biggest share occupies Belarus and Moldova and Jordan and Lebanon.

With regard to the Chart 5 it can be deduced that for the period 2003-2008 the EU and its Southern ENP partners are on the same wavelength regarding trade and this denote a good cooperation between them as well as interdependence. Besides, it demonstrates at some extent that the Barcelona Process generated economic added values. Unfortunately, once with the global financial crisis, it is obvious that the EU economic decline pulled down its Southern partners as well as Eastern. For the last, situation in the East worsened and the trade decreased more.

Overall, such situation explains the fact that the EU economic security depends on its partners and vice versa. So far, both Southern and Eastern ENP partners need a cost-effective strategy for the economy. This is because a paradoxical situation occurs if we look at the Chart 6 that shows the central government trends as % of GDP and the Chart 4 related to imports. It seems that EU partners from the neighbourhood ask for more aid to import and not to developed domestic capabilities to generate an export-led economic growth. Fortunately, for import-oriented countries, a solution could



be that the production possibilities can be developed in services or technology and communications, it means that the import of the last should be transformed into productive means<sup>52</sup>. Probably such situation is also interconnected to the Chart 10, where for instance the Eastern ENP partners spent very few money for research and development being less competitive in comparison with Southern ENP partners. In addition, Mediterranean partners, record more revenues, excluding grants (as % of GDP) in contrast to the East that record less revenues (Chart 7).

Regarding the tax revenue (Chart 8), for the Eastern ENP partners the value preponderantly increased in order to cover the budget deficit.

Finally, the Chart 9 reflects that the military expenditures (% of GDP) in the East boosted for 2004-2007 because of the conflict in Georgia and in the South because of increased military expenditures in Jordan and Israel. Unfortunately, the increasing trends of military expenditures affected the economic growth in the region. Or, it means that the given economy intends to prevent some prospective threats of political order and invest in researches for military purposes as well as uses the labour force that could occupy other economic sector with more added value.

Generally, in trade terms, one can be asserted with certitude that both the Eastern and Southern ENP partners still are at the stage of gaining trust in front of the EU. Both regions do not present too much economic security level; thereby they still need aid from EU. Nevertheless, according to EUROSTAT<sup>53</sup> data regarding trading with the EU it can be mentioned that there are some successes of *acquis* adoption, but in economic security terms this approximation must not be perceived as “a panacea for economic and trade shortcomings”<sup>54</sup> like it is for Moldova. Undoubtedly, the EU and neighbour countries have learned lessons from the previous experiences of Action Plan’s implementation. Likewise it is obvious that for the last period the ENP improved in conditionality and consistency<sup>55</sup>. On the other hand, the FDI inflows shown in the Chart 11 designate the East (mainly due to Georgia and Moldova) as being more attractive in contrast to the South (mainly due to Jordan and Lebanon) and even the EU. This is a good opportunity for the EU partners and it means that this region presents more prospects of cooperation and the economies tend to the functioning on a capitalist basis. However, a lot has to be done concerning the regulatory reform and fight against corruption (Table 1). Regarding the FDI outflows (Chart 12) the EU hold supremacy and is main investor in both regions. Likewise, the Eastern and Southern ENP partners present weak capacity for FDI outflow (Chart 12).

Consequently, the bureaucratic approach to doing business, former legacies of trading (mostly in the East and including the partners’ behaviour), institutional low capacity and flexibility to adapt to new norms and issues related to FDI flows that could contribute to economic growth, all of them explain the incapability to ensure “alliance security”<sup>56</sup>.

In terms of inflation (Chart 13), both regions present weak capacity for stabilisation. For instance in the East, the inflation rate increases because of boosted prices for the consumption on domestic and global market. In addition, it is a worrying sign that the prices of the minimum consumption basket are often dictated by the prices of petroleum products. The South is mainly affected by Egypt with almost 10 % of inflation<sup>57</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Ganesh Wignaraja, Marlon Lezama and David Joiner, *Small states in transition. From vulnerability to competitiveness*. The Commonwealth Secretariat (London: Marlborough House, 2004).

<sup>53</sup> EUROSTAT, accessed March 2, 2013.

<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=teii540>.

<sup>54</sup> Oxana Gutu, “Moldova’s Convergence with the *acquis*. A Pro-Growth and Pro-Integration Strategy.” *CEPS Working Document* 238 ( March 2006): 5.

<sup>55</sup> European Commission, JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT. *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011. Statistical Annex. Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy*, Brussels, 15.5. 2012, SWD (2012) 122 final.

<sup>56</sup> Dent, “Economic Security,” 218.

<sup>57</sup> WB data, [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).

In terms of unemployment, situation remains critical in both regions as well as in the EU. Losing the agriculture and industry value added (% of GDP) have negative impact upon the labour force and as a result it increases the unemployment rate (Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 14). In addition, like Moldova, the rest of the ENP partners do not present efforts in area of labour standards and institutional mechanisms are not cost-effective<sup>58</sup>.

In terms of energy imports (Chart 15), the EU could receive important gains from East and South taking into consideration that overall, both regions import less energy than EU, except Moldova, Belarus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco that are almost totally dependent on energy imports. As stabilising factor regarding energy export and production for the East are Azerbaijan and less Ukraine and Georgia. In the South the added value in energy production and export is due to Libya and Algeria overrunning the EU and the East.

In the end, all actions related to trade and tariffs' barriers, prevention of economic crime and trafficking, illegal migration, custom modernisation and close economic relations among EU member states and the immediate vicinity in border areas are subject for deep Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) which is "a key priority of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)"<sup>59</sup>. This is the first step in exporting security to the EU and importing security from the EU to neighbour partners. Indeed, it is not easy to "promote economic and social development in border areas", "address common challenges", "ensure efficient and secure borders" and "promote people-to-people cooperation"<sup>60</sup>. For this reason in the following table (Table 2) the author intends to organize possibilities of achieving the above objectives and in addition shows the situations when there are risks of failure and insecurity.

**Table 2: Cooperation or defective relation between the EU and the ENP partners**

Situation	Circumstances and results
<b>EU and ENP partner cooperate</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Low transition costs;</li> <li>- Compromise fulfilled;</li> <li>- Foreign policy successfully implemented;</li> <li>- Strong incentives;</li> <li>- Conditionality respected;</li> <li>- Acquis adopted with success;</li> </ul>
<b>EU assisted and the ENP partner did not fulfilled</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU financial and technical assistance was not used according to initial purposes;</li> <li>- The ENP partner did not fully use the foreseen budget.</li> </ul>
<b>EU review its directives towards the neighbourhood</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU fulfilled the compromise but the ENP partner did not;</li> <li>- EU capitalizes but the ENP partner loses the opportunity.</li> </ul>
<b>Lack of control, monitoring and credibility; incapability for regulatory approximation.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lack of coherence and dialogue;</li> <li>- Weak institutional incentives;</li> <li>- Interests other than those supposed to generate positive outcomes above all security.</li> </ul>

*Source: Author's elaboration*

<sup>58</sup> European Commission, JOINT STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the Republic of Moldova. Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action*, Brussels, 15. 5. 2012, SWD(2012) 118 final.

<sup>59</sup> EUROPEAID. "The ENPI Cross - Border Cooperation Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and the Indicative Program 2007-2010," November 2006, Accessed March 10, 2013.

[http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/index_en.htm).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

Overall, it is even difficult for the EU to achieve a “systemic security”<sup>61</sup> taking into consideration the “inside” diversity as well as the “outside” diversity in interests, economic models and values.

#### IV. Conclusions

This article is not about dividing the East from the South but rather to find where (in which region) the EU should take more advantage of security without the fear of losing something and where the EU and its neighbourhood should improve regarding the CBC in order to create a secure zone of cooperation. Yet, the President of the European Commission Barroso declared: “There are as many variations of ENP as there are partners.”<sup>62</sup> From here follows the constant need to revitalize the fundamental principle of the ENP – the differentiation. Hopefully, the ENP is open for improvements and more security and prosperity achievements.

The intent of contrasting Southern Mediterranean with the Eastern neighbours can be made with reservation because both vicinities of the EU differ concerning the democracy perception, the “substance” and interests of the cooperation EU – Neighbourhood, economic values and forms of trading. However, regarding the contribution in macroeconomic terms to average results of each country in the region, author agrees that “Mediterranean countries that, despite internal differences, presents a higher degree of homogeneity”<sup>63</sup>.

The common point for both the EU and its Neighbour Partners is that “security depends equally on reality and perception”<sup>64</sup>. It can occur that what for the EU presents economic security, for the partner country could represent insecurity or even an economic threat. Thus, it is not surprisingly that “security ... strongly depends on others and not only on oneself”<sup>65</sup>.

In this article, author has clarified to what the EU tends instead of the ENP partners that still are at the stage of deciding about what they really want.

In the context of this study, the insecurity issues are also the result of low effort of local governments for the approximation. Besides, the administrative command control (specifically for the Eastern ENP partners), pronounced asymmetries between the domestic policy and foreign policy objectives, discrimination of foreign investors, high level of corruption and regulatory issues prevent the deeper market integration.

Relying on the analysis of macroeconomic indicators as regional average value, author reaches the following conclusions:

- In empirical terms, the two regions are separated by concrete interests, but both Eastern and the Southern ENP partners meet difficulties in ensuring “finance-credit” and “market-access” and even “supply” security;
- The EU would benefit more in terms of energy security in the South than in the East (if we exclude Russia);
- The Eastern ENP partner would bring benefits for the European market regarding the food security, fertile soils and ecologic products. The real problem is that even though the EU intensely assured the East with technical and financial assistance, the Eastern ENP partners have many times neglected the core objectives of the ENP and focused more on EU membership, however;

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<sup>61</sup> Dent, “Economic Security,” 217.

<sup>62</sup> José Manuel Durão Barroso, “Shared challenges, shared futures: Taking the neighbourhood policy forward.” *European Neighbourhood Policy Conference*, Brussels, September 3, 2007, SPEECH/07/502, 3.

<sup>63</sup> Manuella Moschella, “EU’s Regional Approach Towards Its Neighbours: the ENP vis a vis the EMP,” Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med”, University of Catania. 2004, Accessed February 22, 2013, <http://www.fsceo.unict.it/EuroMed/moschella.pdf>, 5.

<sup>64</sup> Marjan Svetlicic and Matija Rojec, “The global economy, security, and small states aspiring for NATO membership,” in *Small states in the Post-Cold war world: Slovenia and NATO enlargement*, ed. Sabic Zlatko and Charles Bukowski (London: Praeger, 2002), 34.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

Undoubtedly internal security issues, especially the economic issues arise from the state's incapacity to prevent and face unpredictable risks. What however distinguishes the EU from its neighbour partners is the fact that Member States are based on the rule of law and namely the law has supremacy. Unfortunately, the EU's neighbours including Moldova and Ukraine have not made changes in the legal framework therefore they strive to rather bypass the law than to respect it, yet.

To end this study, Kratochvil mentioned about the ENP that a lot could be said not only in positive terms<sup>66</sup> and this in fact could explain the existent constraints in economic terms.

Thereby, the author believes that there is much more to say about economic security at the EU level and its surroundings. Each macroeconomic indicator and policy involved require a separate empirical analysis for at least some EU member states that share same border with immediate neighbourhood in the East as well as in the South, in order to find out where is that point that strangles the economic security purposes.

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<sup>66</sup> Petr Kratochvil, "Introduction," in *The European Union and Its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities*, ed. Petr Kratochvil (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2006), 7.

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