

THE NEW DIMENSION OF THREATS THAT THE EUROPEAN ACTORS ARE SUBJECT TO IN NEIGHBORING STATES CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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*Motto: "It's good to have power, but it's
better not to need the power."*

Mahatma Gandhi

Abstract

Restructuring activities of the current international system increases the amplification of the existing inequalities in developing countries with unlimited potential for the European market.

Thus, amid security system vulnerabilities and uncontrolled situations, the local conflicts may spread to neighboring regions, affecting also the strategic security environment.

The dynamics of political and military events reveals that security and defense go beyond the responsibility of a single country, a fact which causes a greater involvement of democratic states and international organizations.

Against this background, the work in question provides not only an insight into the new international dimension, but also a possible response version in order to enable risk and vulnerabilities (of economic, social or religious nature) management, in the benefit of all.

Therefore, restricting undesirable phenomena can be achieved by harmonizing the actions on the various interest sectors at national or international level, similar to the objectives underlying the American concept of "homeland security".

As a solution, the concept itself connects everything that can be connected, when we talk about security, in a widespread network of state intervention mechanisms, namely, the external instruments of power. For this reason, homeland security is characterized by a plurality of stakeholders, from a local and national level to a European and transatlantic one.

Keywords

"security environment", "global stability", "geopolitical changes", "homeland security", "strategic objectives".

The Orient continues to be a traditional hotbed of conflict. We can talk about big states, with some influence, as Turkey, Iran, India, Afghanistan, but history has shown that an outbreak of the conflict in the area has often led to a chain reaction. Regional adversity is generated by regional-cultural differences, which brings Arabs against Muslims or Jews.

Also, according to Karl L. Brown, the region has always been a *penetrated system*, subjected to a high level of external intervention, a fact which nourished the Arab-Israeli hostility. This has been due to the considerable oil resources and the geographical position of the region which is located at the confluence of NATO's interests (via Turkey), Russia, China and, most recently, the EU.

In this context, geographically speaking, Eastern Europe is very close to Russia, so that Moscow believes that the events in the area can directly influence the stability and the security of the country under the concept of *close neighbourhood*. It is important to note, however, that the Middle East is not *stricto sensu* a part of the *close neighbourhood*, as it has never dictated them their

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domestic and foreign policies in the way that it did in Moldova. The East can, however, affect the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus - Chechnya, Daghestan – scandalizing the Islamists. Russia has good intentions regarding the cooperation with the Greater Middle East especially by settling and securing the arms market.

The war in Iraq-2003 was the United States way to demonstrate to Russia that it ignores its global leadership and power ambitions, thus, leading to misunderstandings on the part of Moscow and the EU. However, Russia was not involved in the settlement of the conflict, leaving this task to Germany and France. Russia's drawback - produced by the Iraqi conflict - lies in the fact that regional instability brought with itself the loss of several billion dollars debt, which Iraq owed to Moscow, as well as the loss of the economic-military contracts between Russia and the Saddam regime. In 2004, Moscow canceled 90% of the external debt and promised investments of four billion dollars to rebuild the country. Russia condemned the U.S. intervention, adopting the position of defender of the Arab cause.

As regards the situation in Syria, governmental forces are working now with more determination in order to neutralize the outbreaks of instability, using a variety of means of combat. However, the army has not yet used the full arms potential and combat equipment, the number of troops entering the battle remaining limited.

The chain of events and changes in South-Eastern Europe during the 90s led to policy responses, policy approaches and long-term strategies, which are sophisticated enough for this part of Europe.

The history of the South-Eastern region has no better example than these two European Union principles that interact dialectically. However, the experience of four wars in the last decade in the South-Eastern Europe calls for rethinking and improving the strategic principles and EU instruments for South-Eastern Europe.

The largest and most dangerous instabilities in international relations are typical for transition periods, during which the old and new structures of the international system at different levels are at conflict. Under these circumstances, even the smallest changes can cause strong reactions of transforming the initial conditions.

The Southeast-European instabilities are caused by several structural causes such as:
- The transition from a bipolar world to one not yet defined of the international system, a fact which has led to a trend towards unilateralism and to the transformation of the area into one global clash of interests and states. A national aspect of this process in the region is that some countries tend to gravitate from a global powerhouse to another. The European Union with its Euro-Atlantic dimension is certainly one of these centers of power.

Another consequence is the balkanization, fragmentation of regional relations between states and international relations polarization around centers of power.

After the Cold War, the European Union, the United States and other developed countries made the European integration possible; on the other hand, Russia continued to be hesitant, and wavered between playing the role of broker of the new power balance and being dependent on Balkan countries, respectively playing the constructive role of world leader in the 21st century, by stimulating the regional formation tendencies as a regional organizational expression of globalization.

- The painful changing of the region, from a condition of lack of an economic and trade area, in a more cooperative economic space.

- Internal systemic transitions of some countries in South-East Europe and various national attitudes vis-à-vis social, economic, political and strategic homogeneity, including different orientations of the recent global centers of power.

- Various models and levels of adaptation of some countries in the region to expanding Western democratic state is based on the principle of "common security" and market economy system - a process generated by the collapse of socialism in its Soviet and Yugoslav variant.

- The predominantly destructive disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation, four wars that followed, and the emergence of state-building issues in South Eastern Europe.

It is sufficient to mention only the Cold War period with its three types of state and blocks that existed at that time: NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and those who were not allied. The infrastructure - transport, communications, economic relations, etc. - has reflected the thinking and polarized actions during the Cold War.

The result was the state separation and because they were not related, it was followed by a further distancing of the region from other parts of the world, which adapted to the growing economic, informational, humanitarian imperatives.

A broader picture was clouded by the difficulty which the transitional countries were undergoing (excluding Greece and Turkey); we refer to the countries which have experienced the shift from state ownership and planned economy to private ownership and market economy. The poor management of transformation processes, including economic and political adventurer behavior in some countries, repeated criminal privatization cases so that all these instabilities have generated a whole range of risks, occasionally threatening the continuity of state authority in different countries (Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Republic of Moldova).

Ethnic and religious antagonisms motivated by cognitive, emotional, perception deficiencies and multiplied by careerist political activism. This is the most discussed source of conflict in the last decade - a lasting source of instability, regional and national security threats. Mobilizing Croat ethnics warned observers and participants in the South East European conflicts.

Strategic components and branches that are specific elements of Southeastern Europe security: analyzing the situation in Romania we find that the national security intelligence doctrine (2003) establishes three security strategic components:

- National defense - a set of measures and actions undertaken by the Romanian state to protect and guarantee national values;

- National security - the bail provided by the State in relation to protecting and fulfilling objectives and security interests;

- Public order - a set of politic, economic, social, directions allowing the normal functioning of state institutions, maintaining public peace, assuring citizen security, respecting and protecting their rights.

In the field of international relations, phrases such as the ones enumerated below are more commonly used:

- Collective security: the condition of the relations between states, created by taking, on Treaty, measures of common defense against aggressions;

- areal security (under-regional): situation resulting from the mutual relations established by the states in a relatively small geographic area, with a specific feature that ensures states territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty and protection against any threat;

- Regional security (continental): safety condition of the states in a continent on respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

- Global security: state of the international system in which each state is satisfied by being safe from any such aggression or interference which is able to affect fundamental values;

- Security Policy: an assembly of measures and actions in all social policy areas designed to ensure the optimal state preservation and to strengthen defense and to promote its fundamental interests.

In terms of everyday relationships, we are dealing with the term of citizen safety, representing the convergence of several security subsystems: food, life, economic, financial, social, health, property, environmental, etc. issues.

Hence, at least two logical reasons result:

- Security is more than safety, and by achieving safety it also maintains and protects security;
- National security is a part, but also a course of action or means in achieving security.

Modern situation

An accurate and complete analysis of the current security environment, with the threats it poses to state's national interests requires knowing the evolving trends of global environment and regional security and threats. This approach can give us a closer image on the reality in which the security status needs to be provided.

Today, we face a series of combined threats to international stability, from "modern warfare" to war "without borders" or "asymmetrical warfare". Two main ideas shape what we see occurring with "modern war": the loss of the nation state monopoly on war and the return to the world of cultures in conflict.

Martin van Creveld in his book, "Making War", argues that the modern paradigm of war, where the nation-states wage a war for state reasons, using official armies struggling with other similar organizations is unusual from a historical point of view.

The overall security environment level reveals several trends of influence in the security field, such as: globalization, multiplication and diversification of global security actors, technologies proliferation, as well as the ever-growing importance of non-state actors, environmental issues increasing pressures on military and security processes and population growth.

Dealing with initial threats of a new type of war requires a commitment to propel military thinking and potency. First, we must resort to these qualities when we try to protect ourselves from the tendency to use technology excessively in order to meet new global challenges and the ever-increasing demands on our limited resources and operational forces. Recent events show us that the warfare based on advanced technology is ineffective against terrorism, giving results only when the enemy plays by the same rules, but it cannot simply ignore terrorism.

The new type of threat is due to a wide range of destabilizing factors, from regional gangs acting in border areas to attacks on the financial infrastructure by the organized crime, resulting in new operational and informational challenges.

The connection between war and crime involves ethnic enmity, refugees and criminal exploitation type. Conflicts are often fueled by criminal actions. These criminals usually have less advanced technology, but they are at the beginning of the exploitation of modern technology. The access to this type of technology is facilitated by money offered by criminal organizations, and so goes the distinction between war and crime.

There are far more intangible trends to predict the ability of these groups to influence global stability. In our world connected by cable, global organizations with modest political or economic means may carry out activities with a high impact, but with unpredictable consequences. As regards military intelligence structures, the operational challenge is to prepare our forces to respond to a broad spectrum of unexpected and extremely ambiguous threats. A new design approach to the next war in the 21st century will represent a window throwing light on future missions and providing an accurate assessment of unexpected and undefined threats.

The Black Sea Region

The complexity of the security environment in the Black Sea region highlights a number of state actors, in this case mainly referring to coastal states and non-state actors with an international location.

Wider Black Sea Region is a concept related on the same process of expanding democratic values, stability and peace in Europe, as well as the ones defended by EU and NATO. This is also a region where governments want to achieve security, modernization and a better standard of living for

their citizens. Thus, governments in the region have to deal with cross-border crime and threats given by reheating frozen conflicts.

The main features equally acceptable for the Black Sea region are situated on the line of two concepts that have been assigned two dual visions targeting the region; thus, the region is seen alternatively as a joining area - bridge and transit area - or a dividing area, respectively a border and buffer zone.

The attempts to theorize a cohesion of the region were hit by historical arguments - which has never witnessed a zone cohesion or collaborative culture arguments - non-existent and questioned by numerous unsolved bilateral cases, but also by geopolitical reasons - taking on the specific value, very different and unbalanced of the member countries, ranging from the giant Russian Federation, through the eternal presence of Turkish interests, by returning to the forefront of Ukraine (until recently subordinated to the interests of Moscow) to Romania and Bulgaria, NATO members and the little Georgia with confessed Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

Another issue widely accepted is the need to protect energy routes in the region, no matter if it is the piping route Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhon or TRACECA projects or on Souda Baku-Tbilisi tarmac or railway ones Tbilisi-Poti and Tbilisi-Batumi or the route of Nabucco and the planned White Stream with its variants Souda - Constanta through Crimea and the branch in Odessa Brody Gdansk for gas transport in northern Europe.

The Black Sea countries (Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Russian Federation, Ukraine and Georgia) are interested in creating a climate of stability and security in which they can conduct cooperative projects and economic and social development.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), created in 1992, includes as full members also Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova. Other seven countries: Austria, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Tunisia have observer status.

BSEC decision-making body is the Council of Foreign Ministers, whose international secretariat has permanent headquarters in Istanbul. It is seen primarily as an experiment in order to prepare the EU enlargement and to train candidates in this regard.

Aspects of military cooperation in the area have not yet been addressed in the countries of the region, but only through bilateral or trilateral security plans. A hope for the normal regulation can be brought by the BSEC Organization, where they initiated a series of measures for nomination the situation in the region and cooperation in many fields, among all Member States.

It is worth emphasizing bilateral and multilateral military relations with the Black Sea countries, including neighboring countries: Bulgaria, Ukraine and Moldova, but also the project of Naval Cooperation in the Black Sea (Blackseafor) with the participation of Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine. Multilateral under-regional cooperation will mark the participation of Romania, together with Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, Albania (Slovenia and the USA as observers) at the Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe (MPF-SEE).

In the Romanian interest area, handling minorities represent the main sources generating risks and threats to national security. Despite the positive developments of international relations, in particular with neighboring States, the history confirms that Romania's political-geographic neighborhoods have influenced our destiny often.

In geopolitics of Europe, Romania has understood the need to use, as better as it could, its whole diplomatic assembly in order to overcome territorial or border disputes, crisis or potential conflicts.

Currently, the issue of economic security moves from the field of national economies in an increasingly well-defined regional and international economic complexes space. The accession and integration structures such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization are provided to participate and benefit from the advantages of regionalization and globalization.

About Threats

Early - to mid-1990s - represented a period of drastic change regarding the national security conditions for the EU Member States and the Balkan countries. For Greece, this change was complicated by an internal political transformation that began in 1974 and continued through the 90s. Among the factors that have an influence on the security situation in Greece during this period are found the political, economic, social, and regional ones, but also the location of Greece in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean.

On the one hand, Athens has to adapt to the new security environment that emerged after the Cold War ended. Being a part of the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, Greece is geographically located in an unstable area.

Moreover, Athens had to deal also with "traditional" threats. For most European countries, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union triggered a profound change in their security policies. Greece was an exception to this rule, because for decades, Greek security policy considerations were dominated by threats from Ankara. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey remains the main concern of security for Athens.

Today post-Cold War global structures are in a state of flux. Analysts and policy makers in small countries try to identify and predict trends and recommend adjustment policies in developing models worldwide.

The challenge for Greece, a country of medium size, set strategically, and independent is to protect its territorial integrity, democratic system and values. Today's Greece can be described as democratic, internationalist, Western, free enterprise-oriented, and a sensible strategic outpost of the European Union and NATO, in troubled regions of the Balkans and Central and Eastern Mediterranean.

Following two "catastrophic" changes (the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union), the Mediterranean region, the Middle East and much of its surrounding areas are in the midst of a rapid geopolitical development, however, without a clear direction. Analysts discern an "arch or triangle of crisis, stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia, Transcaucasia and Middle East." Most regimes in these regions are facing or will soon be facing a crisis of political legitimacy.

In addition, the transition from free bi-polarity to polycentrism, after the Cold War, has increased the autonomy of regional actors and intensified peripheral conflicts. The new environment presents the "actors" with new threats and opportunities.

Greece's strategic position mattered in obtaining NATO membership (1952). During the Cold War, Greece provided an essential link on the southeastern flank of NATO.

Turkey, for example, could have been isolated from other NATO members, if Greece wouldn't have participated also to the Alliance. For many Greek decision-makers, the country's strategic importance to the West has been underestimated and sometimes even neglected. Successive Greek governments have continued, however, to contribute on the Western defense strategy community.

Given the rather chaotic nature of the international system, small states, with their limited capacities, try to deal with their security problems by developing strategies based on the balance (internal and external) and / or alignment. Because small countries have fewer options and less freedom of maneuver than big powers in order to promote security interests more effectively, Greece sought to integrate its policies in their partners' ones from the European Union and NATO allies.

From a historical point of view, the main strategic dilemma for Greek policy makers was whether to ally with the dominant maritime power in Eastern Mediterranean region or with the dominant land power in the Balkan Peninsula. In most cases, aware of their responsibility to defend two thousand Greek islands that stretch from the eastern Aegean Sea to the Adriatic, they chose to ally with maritime power.

During the 1940s and early 1950s, the difference between conservatives and liberals (communists were outcasts because of the civil war in Greece) on security issues and NATO had its

importance. Basically, both groups believe that the main threat regarding the Greek security comes from beyond its northern borders and communism (external and internal) threatened mutual cherished values. Therefore, NATO was seen as essential to national defense and the United States have been treated as a natural ally and guarantor of Greece.

Greek defense orientation until the mid-1960s was based on the U.S. belief that the main security problem would be internal rather than external. Greek armed forces (in contrast to Turkey's) were first stocked and organized to meet internal communist threat. According to NATO planning, it was expected that Greece, "with some limited equipment, could cause a delay of Soviet forces in the event of a global war."

Even earlier than the late 1950s, the southeastern flank of NATO has faced periodic cycles of high intensity. The emergence of the Cyprus problem in 1950, the Greek-Turkish crisis in 1960, the Greek Junta done after the 1974 coup and the Turkish invasion and occupation of the island (which continues today) was complicated by a series of Greco-Turkish friction in the Aegean region, due to the pressure of Turkey to revise the Aegean status quo. This has led to refocusing the defense doctrine in Greece, with the officially declared "threat from the East", as the main concern for security.

Restoring the democratic regime in 1974 was indeed a major turning point in Greek Security Policy. This new period of Greek political history, lasting from 1974 until now, has been characterized by diversifying the external relations in Greece, including a relative decrease regarding its relations with the U.S., in favor of economic and political integration in Western Europe and improving relations with Eastern Europe.

In the post-Cold War era, Greece faces what she considers a major threat to security and a number of risks: the threat is seen as coming from her neighbor in the East (Turkey) and risks are considered as resulting from the instability in regions like the Balkan and the Mediterranean. In addition, Greece is involved in a dispute on the issue of recognition of the official name of FYROM and is concerned about human rights for the Greek minority in Albania.

The perception of a potential military threat from Turkey was widely shared by the public opinion and reflected in expert debates, as well as in the security planning for at least the last two decades. Cyprus crisis of 1974 can be seen as turning point in Greek security considerations after the Second World War: Turkish invasion and the subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus, was for Greece, a very traumatic experience, but also the basis for "new thinking" in terms of security.

Greek security planners are concerned about Turkey's revisionist objectives regarding Greece, expressed in official statements, diplomatic initiatives and military actions (including conducting "offensive" armed forces in the Aegean). Its reduced geography and population, compared with that of Turkey further increases insecurity in Greece.

As one analyst points out, "Turkish officials' statements that, usually are on the first page in the media in Greece, has intensified Greek fears. For example, the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel stated in 1975 that "... half of the Aegean is ours. Everyone knows that it is ... We know how to crush our enemies' heads when Turkish nations' prestige, dignity and interests are attacked." Moreover, direct challenges (e.g. "the group of islands, are located at a distance of 50 km from the Turkish coast ... should belong to Turkey") and doubts about the Greek sovereignty over the Aegean islands were regarded with fear.

"Revisionist actions" in Turkey include violating the Greek airspace, the refuse to show delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf to the International Court of Justice, threats of war, in case of Greek maritime territorial limits expansion, from six to twelve miles (according to the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982), and challenges in the Aegean status quo, codified by several international treaties (1923 - Peace Treaty of Lausanne, 1932 - Agreement between Turkey and Italy, and the Treaty of Paris in 1947, which led to Imia crisis in January 1996).

Policymakers in Greece believe that Turkey hides its unfriendly intentions behind significant military capabilities. Since 1991, Turkey has launched an impressive program of modernization its armed forces. Such a considerable increase in military spending at a time when other European countries, USA and Russia have reduced their defense budgets in an effort to benefit from the "peace dividend" is a concern for neighboring countries, including Greece.

The full implementation of Turkey's weapons programs threatens with changing the principles of the bilateral Greek-Turkish balance of power, despite the economic sacrifices that confronts Greece. If, through diplomatic means and maneuvers, it might produce a balancing of the Turkish military superiority, the only option available for Greece remaining a costly and destabilizing military race, which could create economic problems for both countries and would enhance their security dilemma.

According to security analysts in Greece, the focus of any armed conflict between Greece and Turkey would be the Aegean Islands and Cyprus (by extending the occupation of the south, or even trying to control the whole island).

The end of the Cold War deeply affected Greek security. Although its strategic value probably increased, it also faced the fluidity and uncertainty of the northern borders. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the civil war gave rise to a variety of explosive tensions of ethnic, political, social and economic nature, which represented an acute concern for Athens. The proximity and fear that instability in the Balkans (limited to the former Yugoslav Republic or general) could paralyze Greece's integration into European trends, created a state of vulnerability. The economic parameters of the problem are significant. Greece was based on rail and road communications throughout Yugoslavia which accounted for 40 percent of its trade with the European market. Prolonged rupture of this vital link had direct economic consequences on Greece and led to the imposition of sanctions by the European Union against the Federal Government of Yugoslavia. Greek authorities have estimated that the imposition of these sanctions led to losses of about \$ 10 million per day.

Moreover, it is worrisome the situation that would cause a disintegration of the southern part of the former Yugoslavia, which would lead to the employment of foreign powers in conflict.

Greek-Bulgarian consultations on security issues have been encouraged by the insecurity state felt by both countries in relation to Turkey's military power and political interests in the Balkans (relations between Bulgaria and Turkey became difficult as a result of Turkish minority maltreatment during the communist regime in the mid-1980s). In this context, we could talk about the Athens-Sofia axis. Bilateral relations have peaked in 1986, with the proclamation of the "Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation" which stated that there could be held consultations between the two countries involved, whenever the security of one of them was in danger (a term used by the Greeks during Greek-Turkish crisis in March 1987).

In an attempt to interpret the Greek security policy, certain factors can be identified. In every system of policy developing, there are various political, cultural, institutional and psychological factors influencing policy implementation process. These factors are both endogenous and exogenous and reflect recent trends, but also a long-term state security policy.

The progressive approach of Greece to the European foreign policy, continuous uncertainty characterizing Greek-Turkish relations, the dominant role of personalities in decision making and the lack of an institutional organization meant to ensure long-term assessment on a wide range of security issues and assist / coordinate crisis management mechanisms are the dominant factors shaping Greek Security Policy.

The main institutional bodies responsible for foreign and defense policy - The Government Council Cabinet on Foreign Affairs and Defense (GCFDM) - do not produce alternative policies. They almost never meet, and when they do, they implement and legitimize choices already made by the Prime Minister and a small group of Ministers. Despite a number of initiatives undertaken in

recent years - such as the creation of a Foreign Policy Council (FPC) - Greece still lacks proper coordination of policies to meet the challenges of a stable regional and international environment.

FPC consists of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, members of all parties represented in the Greek Parliament, and a number of experts. The Council aims to reach consensus on foreign policy issues and to provide "continuity and consistency". The unique role of the Foreign Policy Council is to provide advice on matters of foreign policy and not to coordinate other bodies or to engage in crisis management.

It carefully considered the need of establishing a new institution able to coordinate the existing scattered bodies from different ministries, to offer timely advice on a range of issues, establish a stringent crisis management mechanism and to oversee every step in making policy.

Greece's military doctrine is defensive at the strategic level, in accordance to NATO position. Its objective is to eliminate any threat or actual attack against Greece and protect Greek national interests. Greece, as a status quo country, aims at convincing any revisionist powers, following a cost-benefit analysis, that a possible aggression would not be favorable for the latter. Deterrence by threat would be credible and can take many forms, including denial targets on the battlefield, damages suffered by the military, and other values. At the tactical level, the doctrine may have a defensive or counter-offensive orientation, depending on the circumstances.

After the impressive performance of the U.S. armed forces in the Gulf War, Greece decided to reorganize its ground forces, with emphasis on smaller units (from divisions and regiments to brigades and battalions), with increased mobility.

In 1994, Greece and Cyprus have developed the Common Defense Doctrine. According to this doctrine, as long as Turkey maintains an occupying force of more than 30,000 troops in Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot defense domain would increase the level of cooperation. In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would constitute a *casus belli* for Greece. The initiative (in fact, a policy of deterrence) has a clear defensive character and is aimed at avoiding or confronting any aggression against the contracting parties by improving cooperation and joint training of armed forces in Greece and Cyprus.

Since 1974, when Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied a share of 37 percent of its territory, Greece has maintained a high level of defense spending (an average of 6 percent of GDP, which is the largest of the NATO countries). Military and intensive training spending were deemed necessary in order to offset Turkey's quantitative advantage of military equipment and labor. Although there is consensus among the main political parties and the Greek people about the need to "sacrifice" for national defense, military spending is a heavy burden for the Greek economy at a time when Greece is implementing an economic austerity program in order to join the next phase of the European Monetary Union. However, in the wake of the Imia crisis and the announcement of a Turkish weapons program of \$ 31 billion (for over 10 years), Greece was forced to announce a program of \$ 14 billion (on a period over 5 years).

Conclusions

Europe has a legacy of violent terrorist attacks going back to the days of multinational empires in Russia, Austro-Hungary and Germany. In the United Kingdom, Spain and France, terrorist bomb attacks occur at regular intervals. Shootings are a manifestation of the traditional challenges against national and international security. This form of violent protest against the established political order will continue to exist for a long time.

Strengthening security in a broader sense is compromised for the sake of resolving acute situation. Serious disruption on the internal market of European societies could be a form of structural threat that must be confronted by public authorities.

In Europe, an early warning sign of this trend was recorded by the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. In this context, a cloud of radiation was then sent to Ukraine, Central and Northern Europe. The

accident resulted in damage to human and animal health, agriculture and business for more than a decade.

Under these circumstances, national governments have to deal with security issues involving critical infrastructure of society and governance requirements. Thus, the objectives of national defense and international security are not allowed to build new infrastructure vulnerabilities.

The technological complexity of modern society opens up opportunities for the development of a high risk, produced by strong coupling between sectors and across national borders. Interconnecting infrastructure has become part of everyday life, since the society depends on reliable power supply systems, robust communication and IT networks operations. Naturally, antagonists wanting to harm society have interests in finding critical points, where different facilities have common elements. A major task in planning the achievement of societal security is to turn potential vulnerabilities related to the technological complexity into highly reliable systems.

The economic dimension of security is actually an extension of economic security and the other areas. The economic dimension of security, as well as the economic security itself, it has not only a linear determination - when the economy is performing, the security is more secure, but a non-linear, dynamic and complex one, characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability.

In the context of international dynamic, partnerships multiply, international organizations and bodies evolve unpredictably (some are strengthening, others corrode) and the regional ones multiply and adapt to specific conditions.

The purpose of all these partnerships, unions, organizations and bodies is to ensure conditions for optimizing economic, political, social, informational and military relations, in order to establish and consolidate a less dangerous security environment, for increasing person, property, institution, states and world security.

There is still a chance that the security environment, founded and grounded on value systems and a dynamic, explosive, complex and high performance economy becomes favorable for long-term development, progress and peace.

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