

A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Following its enlargements towards East, the European Union found itself near a complicated zone, which influences its security environment. Launched in 2009 at the Prague Summit the Eastern Partnership aims to provide a new framework for cooperation between the EU and other six Eastern European and Southern Caucasus countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. In the same time, the Eastern Partnership attempts to provide the conditions needed to improve political association and economic integration between the European Union and these countries. In this paper I analyze the way in which the Northern Dimension and the Southern Mediterranean dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy are influencing the political discourse found at the European level regarding the security issues. More precisely I want to identify the tools used to choose which interests are more important: those regarding the Southern Mediterranean or those concerning the Northern Dimension and how they are ranked. Further, I look at the way in which those interests are shaping the framework for the Eastern Partnership and for cooperation between the states. Are there similar approaches to the problems or different goals for this Partnership? I am interested to find out how different perceptions regarding security – those from the North, South and East are aggregated to provide an accurate framework for cooperation in Eastern Europe.

KEY WORDS: European Union, European Neighbourhood Policy, security, Southern Caucasus.

INTRODUCTION

In this article I will use EU's European Neighbourhood Policy to see the way in which it helps to formulate an European response to the security problems found at the regional level, within the context of its foreign policy. My theoretical approach is a neo-liberalist one, and I argue that the European Union it seeks to establish good trade relations with the countries found in the Eastern neighborhood in order to promote Western values such as a democratic political regime, the rule of law and the enforcement of human rights in order for it to ensure a peaceful environment. The article aims to present in a systematic way the instruments used in order to establish rules and institutions for the both participants in the negotiating process, and I mean by that for the European Union, and for the eastern and/or northern countries. The second aim is to show the ways in which domestic interest in the member countries influences the EU's foreign policy and interests' prioritization.

1. Looking for common interests

In the aftermath of the Second World War, some European leaders such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman returned to the idea of a "European Union", which was exposed in 1929 by Aristide Briand in front of the League of Nations². To ensure peace on the continent Europe needed to learn to cooperate, and in order to achieve this it had to identify common interests, in order for all the states to work towards them. The first document which placed great importance on cooperation was Franco-British Defence Treaty signed in 1947 in Dunkirk, followed by the signing in 1948 of the Brussels

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² Bărbulescu, Iordan,: *UE de la economic la politic* (București: Tritonic, 2005), p. 62.

Treaty, by France, Britain, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg³. It should be noted that France, and especially Britain were the only European countries that also hold powerful armies that could be considered as subjects of a treaty relating to defense. The signing in 1948 of Western Union Treaty, which was created in order to obtain "economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defense"⁴ in Brussels on March 17, and amended by the Protocol signed in Paris on October 23 1954, reinforced this position. Member States have decided to integrate their air defense and to have a common command for joint exercises. This move was seen as the necessary step for greater involvement on the U.S. part in its relationship with Europe and with its defense and security, in this framework, special attention was paid to the role of West Germany in the new architecture of security and defense. In October 1950, in order to facilitate the integration of Germany, France proposed an European army which would have been under NATO's command. Further, this put the foundations for the "European Defence Community (EDC) in which Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany were due to participate"⁵. The Treaty was signed in May 1952, but in August 1954 the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty.

So here is that despite the general perception that the European idea started in order to satisfy the economic needs, the entire European project had the primary goal of meeting the security needs of the Western European states. What followed was but the continuation of this approach, but on the contrary. The defence dimension was blocked due to the personality of leaders, and I am referring to French President Charles De Gaulle, either because of shifting resources to other sectors, and I refer to the implementation of the Marshall Plan. One of the communities that would have to safeguard the continent was the European Defence Community, but it failed to become a pillar of European construction and remained for almost 50 years to wait for the attention of European leaders. The most common explanation for this is that NATO was an alliance which managed to coagulate expectations and interests of its members and provide both North America and Western Europe, security for more than six decades. The article's structure requires us to mention a brief theoretical explanation for Alliance's role in the context of bipolar system which emerged after the end of World War II. My approach here is a regional one, so the actions taken by a player at this level are possible and allowed, but not conditioned, in relationship with the system and therefore I consider it appropriate for clarity to say that the Alliance was responsible for providing security through systemic lens, but at the regional level the Europeans were able to decide that they have other interests. Let's remember that even today, U.S. and Russian Federation remain by far the most significant players in terms of nuclear capabilities, but this is not the subject of this article. What I am looking for is to explain how the EU is seeking to ensure security in the eastern neighborhood and to clarify its interests.

Even before the end of the Cold War, the Western European Union (WEU) was reactivated, although the Genscher-Colombo initiative failed in 1981 to expand the European Political Cooperation (EPC) beyond the economic aspects of security and defense sphere, but at least brought into attention this weakness in the European construction. Thus, in Rome under the guidance of French and Belgian governments have a meeting of Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, which adopted on 26/27 October the "Rome Declaration", reads the restart WEU. The plan aimed to "define a European security identity and the gradual harmonization of policies in the defense of members (...) continuing need to strengthen European security and the recognition that better use of WEU will contribute not only to West Europe's security, but also to improve links to common defense states the

³ Howorth, Jolyon, : *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 4.

⁴ <http://www.weu.int/>, accessed on 15.01.2012.

⁵ <http://www.weu.int/>, accessed on 25.01.2012.

Atlantic Alliance”⁶. I think the Rome Declaration is important because it stress that crises in other parts of the world might have implications for Europe. Thus, this statement allows WEU Council to decide which would be the consequences for Europe and to act accordingly. From that date, the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, the Member States were to have annual meetings at conferences of WEU.

In the meantime at the systemic level, U.S. and the USSR began to discuss the withdrawal of nuclear missiles and at the regional level, through this meetings and fund actions we can understand that the European players tried to formulate coherent response in order to ensure their own defense. Thus, WEU Council and its Special Working Group produced a report specifying the criteria and conditions for European security and European specific responsibilities within NATO. Based on this report it was adopted at Hague in 1987 “Platform of the European Security Interests” which establishes the general conditions for a future work program and stating in its preamble: “We reaffirm our commitment to building a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act who was signed by the members of European Community. We believe that achieving an integrated Europe will not be possible unless it includes security and defense”. The European security was seen as indivisible, while the Ministers committed themselves to take actions in order to obtain the “European pillar of NATO”⁷. Also in Hague the WEU had continued to attract members of the Alliance, and decided to open negotiations with Portugal and Spain which became members in 199

In this period, European security story is the story of coalition’s efforts on both sides of the Atlantic, to harmonize and streamline the military defense strategies of deterrence and war in Europe. Through these years for Europe, the security threat is perceived as especially political and less military⁸.

2. The end of the Cold War and its impact on the European security

After 1990, the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the U.S.’s victory in first Gulf War, the U.S. now had a different position, as the undisputed hegemon of the international system. The international system had become unipolar, so it had one powerful state that had the resources to intervene wherever and whenever to defend its interests. Meanwhile, the U.S. tried to encourage and strengthen attempts to formulate a defense and security policy in Europe and the end of the Cold War brought changes not only at the systemic level, but also at regional level, where the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 in through which the European Union had emerged. The economic dimension of the European construction had almost been achieved and in 2002 when the Euro was introduced, as the symbol of economic unity. Certainly an incentive in this process was and the end of the Cold War, which allowed for Germany’s reunification. Putting things in a new economic phase allowed European leaders to rethink the policy of defense of the continent, and the old political project of a European defense community has been re-launched.

Another variable that affected the EU security was - at the regional level- , the disintegration of Yugoslavia. While the Cold War was named by Deutscher as “an ideological confrontation, great competition between democracy and totalitarianism, between capitalism and socialism”⁹ in the early 90’s the world, and especially Europe had faced a different kind of conflict, one that Mary Kaldor called “new wars”. This form of conflict occurs due to pressure that globalization exerts on some authoritarian states. Such wars are fought “through networks belonging to state and non-state, often without uniform, wearing distinctive signs (...) battles are rare and most violence is directed against civilians, as a consequence muster tactics against riots or ethnic cleansing. In these wars are diminishing taxation and financing of the war is robbery, illegal trading and other income generated

⁶ <http://www.weu.int/>, accessed on 25.01.2012.

⁷ <http://www.weu.int/>, accessed on 15.01.2012.

⁸ Kolodziej, Edward A., *Security and International Relations* (Iași: Polirom, 2007), p. 121.

⁹ Kaldor, M., *Human Security* (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010), p. 16.

by the war (...) as opposed to old wars, which ended with a victory or a defeat, no new wars end occurs as quickly”¹⁰. These new security challenges are related to the development of the phenomenon called globalization and the challenges it brings to the state. In this case, the state, the fundamental unit in analyzing the phenomenon of international relations must be able to meet these challenges.

When we want to analyze security we use most often a relational definition. This is explained by the fact that the state of security or insecurity is by reference to an external object which is in the state of security or insecurity. In most cases we should operate with a generally accepted definition of security and in most times it is referred to as lack of threats or, more precisely, as A. Wolfers said: “Security points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired”¹¹. He also identifies two dimensions for conceptualizing the term. We have an objective approach and a subjective one: “an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. In both respects a nation’s security can run a wide gamut from almost complete insecurity or sense of insecurity at one pole, to almost complete security or absence of fear at the other”¹². Security refers to the individual and the main object to which it target is that the State it can be managed into independent sectors: social, political and economic. Defining the security interests is made by policymakers and in defining what they are the perceptions they have regarding threats, risks and vulnerabilities are important. These perceptions are subjective and what a policymaker can perceive as a threat to another may be an opportunity because the environment in which an individual operates can lead to “inevitable pressure”¹³. Other important concepts when we define security are threat and vulnerability. Security can be achieved by reducing vulnerabilities and preventing or reducing threats¹⁴. Threats can be defined as imminent dangers to national security and they come from outside the state. If threats were perceived to source outside the state, vulnerabilities arise due to the internal structure of states. Due to existing weaknesses in the structure, the state becomes vulnerable to an external threat and that is why when institutions and their operating mechanisms are developed, state vulnerability will decrease. National security and citizen security is not necessarily the same thing. Citizen may be subject to threats that have as source state¹⁵ and the wars in former Yugoslavia could not be demonstrated more clearly so. States with a strong institutional structure and a clearly defined idea of state were appointed by B. Buzan as powerful states, the antithesis, weak states are the least institutional developed and “are structured diffuse compared with their companies”¹⁶.

The weak and the strong states are vulnerable to threats from unconventional fields such as the ecological, economic, social and combining the threats and vulnerabilities results insecurity¹⁷. Threats exist in the international system because there is both anarchy and competition. The risks, they are difficult to operationalized, while also being difficult to identify and have a low probability to occur. But as a threat to turn into a threat to national security it must be of a certain type and be perceived as such by policy makers:

“Specifying its intensity, its approach in time and space, the probability of performance, serious consequences, and whether or not the perception of threat is amplified by historical

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.13.

¹¹ Wolfers, A. 1952: “National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol, in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1952), pp. 481-502.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 485.

¹³ Buzan, B.,: *People, States and Fear* (Chişinău: Cartier, 2000), p. 34.

¹⁴ Ungureanu, S. R.,: The Concept of Security in A. Miroiu şi R.S. Ungureanu (coord.) *The Handbook of International Relations*, (Iaşi: Polirom, 2006), p. 120.

¹⁵ Buzan, *op. cit.* p. 54.

¹⁶ For details regarding the difference between weak states and strong states see Buzan, B.,: *People, States and Fear* (Chişinău: Cartier, 2000), pp. 105-7.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 120.

circumstances. The more intense the threat, the more legitimate national security is invoked in response to it.¹⁸

Weak states are susceptible to vulnerabilities that have developed institutions to ensure their operation. The combination of two factors: weak state and low power leads to a very high vulnerability and examples of such countries as Ethiopia, Uganda, and Mozambique. Real threats are difficult to identify and measure because threats are dependent on subject-object dichotomy, and that's problematic distinction between what is truly a national security threat to which results naturally from participation in the international threats prove to be difficult to control. Not all threats can be classified as national security threats. Natural threats can be assigned attributes as usual normal frequency - as threats to national security may be attributed adjectives such as dangerous, unusual¹⁹. The classification decision maker considers these threats primarily political criteria. Establishing threats is a difficult and extensive because if their number is high use of resources results in an unjustified paranoia and attitude type. On the other hand, if their number is lower just because were not properly identified may be greatly hampered response to these threats.

The '90 have forced the international community, and especially Europe to bring an answer to the atrocities in Bosnia, and this response was humanitarian intervention. Destabilization of the area would have been a direct threat to the European Union, and new wars tended to expand through criminal networks, refugees and the promotion of exclusive ideologies²⁰.

3. Towards a Common European Security Policy

In December 1998, the Franco-British summit held in St. Malo, had founded a new European policy that would be known as the European Security and Defence Policy. This Summit marked a change in Great Britain's position to the European common defense and managed to improve its proximity to the European Union. At the summit in St. Malo, it was decided to be obtained autonomous EU military capabilities, laying the foundations of European defense policy. In the Declaration of St. Malo talking about the need for EU to become an autonomous and unified on the international scene, which involved application of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Council was given the opportunity to take decisions on common defense within the framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the method of inter-governmentalism. To initiate the work which requires a common defense policy, the EU should build its own military force that can act in a clearly defined period of time and able to respond to international crises. This approach does not exclude obligations that Member States, namely those arising from membership of NATO and the declaration reaffirms the need for armed forces to be supported by technology and defense European industry. Although, currently insufficient, European armed forces can be extended and nuclear weapons of France and Great Britain could provide some independence for WEU²¹. Intergovernmental conferences, as the main instrument which sets out new decisions in the Union, demonstrated the difficulty in taking these decisions in areas where both individuals and states are sensitive. Conference prior to the Maastricht Treaty, which took place after removal of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, showed deep differences between member states' interests.

Delegation of sovereignty was made to the Commission and to Parliament for the economic field, while the sovereignty for the field of security will be towards the Council of Ministers and that is why the national veto will lose its role. States that have fewer resources, or are on a lower position in terms of resource allocation for assuring security will be willing to cooperate or to cede sovereignty in comparison with those who have more resources.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 142.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 123.

²⁰ Kaldor, M.,: *Human Security* (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010), p. 16.

²¹ Conry, B. *The Western European Union As NATO's Successor*, Cato Policy Analysis No. 239, September 18, 1995, available at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html>, accessed on 10.01.2012.

Main principles of CFSP can be summarized in: promoting and defending peace abroad, democracy and human rights - the fundamental values of the Union, Union's participation in building a society based on international law as a method by which the foundations of world development based on peace and stability, use "cooperation" as opposed to "taxation" - that means that conflicts can be managed and resolved international opportunities offered by multilateral cooperation, economic and social model European export due to the effects it has had to the competitively and solidarity as well because this model has kept "society" before state and market. And the last principle is that of using power as a stability factor²².

It can be seen that especially the last principles' focus is on methods of meeting modern safety variant and not the classic model that emphasizes hard power and military factor: democracy for preventing political threats and market economy, but ensuring solidarity in order to prevent economic threats. These principles were common vision of states in terms of foreign policy. It can be argued quite simply that these measures were accepted because they are shared by all Member States, the reflections of principles that must be met to be part of the Union, being the working group and taken by the Presidium. Unlike Laeken, in discussions within the Working Group did not use the term foreign policy or the common foreign policy, but the term joint action. The difference between external action and foreign policy is significant. Action has a weaker effect compared to politics. Policy needs objectives and targets, instruments, budget and program coherence and to apply. Common foreign policy had been designed by European federalists on the similarity of the Common Agricultural Policy this is chin by European Parliament resolution on the powers of the Commission and asked it in a document dated May 2002²³.

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This new direction that the European cooperation took was deemed essential not only for the EU but also for the transatlantic partnership. Thus, a few months later, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright was to provide an official position on how the partnership it will evolve under the influence of the new approach. The speech preceded the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999. Her article, entitled *The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future*²⁴ it reaffirms that the primary purpose of the Alliance as defense against aggression and encouraged greater autonomy in managing their defenses and possible development of a European army. This approach is complementary to NATO and facilitates its mission, but the Americans allies assessed from the perspective of NATO, considering that it is his contribution to the efficiency of its activities and calling for strengthening its practical side. A step in this direction was taken when he developed "extraction force" under NATO's command, but made up of European power and is available to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. As the article had appeared in the aftermath of Kosovo, the author points to important lessons that could be learned by the European leaders, namely the need to reach a political agreement and high attention to be given to the political will. It seems that a case study was the war in Georgia, were have been applied the lessons in the former Yugoslavia. Another important finding of the Secretary of State is that NATO and the EU should avoid three potential problems: decoupling, duplication and discrimination. This is why the article has come to be known as "the three D". Decoupling refers to the avoidance of a fault between the U.S., EU and NATO as an organization to maintain involving sovereign states.

²² The principles appeared in Bărbulescu, I. *op. cit.*, p. 251.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 256.

²⁴ Available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf>, pp. 24-27, accessed on 10.01.2012.

Second, duplication mainly aimed at eliminating the dissipation of resources that are used for defense, such as action planning forces, operational command structures that would not be found in both blocks. The third and final recommendation was to avoid discrimination between countries that are members of NATO, but not of the EU. The Alliance will be important for the European defence, but not central to it. Its goals will be related to the development of responsibility for the new democrat states. The idea of community and extending it to appear particularly strong in this article, and the Eastern dimension of the possible future community is also mentioned by stating that the outstanding partnership with Ukraine. Russia's role remained unchanged, but unlike the late '90s, when the article appeared, now the focus is no longer put emphasis on the Western Balkans, but the Caucasus. In terms of what in the statements of the St. Malo Declaration, we find that the European policy and security policy are perceived as a political element that has institutional coherence, however, one of its main instruments, the Eastern Partnership is seen as a way to resolve conflicts in the Eastern part of the continent²⁵. We cannot mention E.U.'s autonomy in managing its security issues, without mentioning the importance of the events of September 11, which certainly had a major role in realizing the need to define and prioritize perceived threats in a framework different from NATO, but complementary to it. Probably due to the safety and predictability offered by the North of the continent, it was launched in 1999 the Northern Dimension of the policy, which includes four main actors: the E.U., Russian Federation, Norway and Iceland and covers an area stretching from Europe to the Arctic and sub -Arctic Sea to southern leaf, the Member under and near, and north-western Russia in the east to Iceland and Greenland in the west²⁶. Therefore, the Northern Dimension focuses primarily on promoting and strengthening the economic dimension of cooperation between the E.U. and partners in order to achieve sustainable development. The success of this approach led in 2006 to extended areas where partnerships have been concluded as follows: medium (NDEP), Public Health and Welfare (NDPHS), culture (NDPC) and transport and logistics (NDPTL). Also, the renewal of cooperation, which took place in 2006, had set up common institutions: Institute of the Northern Dimension and the Northern Dimension Business Council. To what extent the political and economic areas helped existing institutional success of this first instrument belonging to foreign policy and security policy remains to be learned.

The E.U.'s south border was approached by the European officials in 1995 when the Barcelona process was launched, the then 15 Member States, together with 14 Mediterranean countries laid the foundation for Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The main purpose of this policy is to ensure the security partnership by developing a common area of peace and stability based on respect for the UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights²⁷. Among the common threats that the document identifies and that were agreed upon by the political representatives were: fighting terrorism through strengthening international instruments, the fight against expansion and diversification of organized crime and combating drug trafficking issues, joint efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and harmonized action with others in order to enforce regional disarmament agreements such as areas free of weapons - including verification regimes to achieve a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological. After ensuring these objectives then it will be developed the economic cooperation because no economic prosperity can be achieved in an area. Measures to ensure free trade area were taken through the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, which will be supported by financial assistance of the Union. The Barcelona Process –as these agreements are known proved to be a success and was

²⁵ Huff, Ariella. *The role of EU defence policy in the Eastern neighbourhood*, May 2011, Occasional Paper, European Union Institute for Security Studies http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op91-The_role_of_EU_defence_policy_in_the_Eastern_neighbourhood.pdf.

²⁶ http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/index_en.htm, accessed on 28.12.2011.

²⁷ Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf, accessed on 27.12.2011.

renewed in 2008. Decisions in this partnership are made by sector-specific Ministerial meetings and the meetings of Foreign Ministers, who are those who set priorities. Since 2005, it has been agreed by at Barcelona summit that terrorism can be better prevented and obstructed by adopting Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct for Countering Terrorism and migration which has become the fourth pillar of the partnership, along with free trade area and cooperation in relevant areas of economic and financial assistance. The Partnership's funding was supported by the European Commission through the Community budget being allocated so far amount to 16 billion euros. Also, the European Investment Bank has allocated annual loans of up to 2 billion.

Building on the success of this partnership and expansion prior to 2004, in March 2003 was introduced the concept of Wider Europe. Since then the number of Member States has reached 25 and the number of inhabitants to 450 million. Different from the '90s the language in this document uses new terms that are used to refer to geographic areas that are re-defined as follows, thus, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus used the Western Newly Independent States concept (WNIS), and for Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia phrase applies Southern Mediterranean.

E.U. used as the key- term for its relations interdependence, saying the E.U. has the same duty towards its citizens and towards those who are citizens of neighboring countries and provide them with social cohesion and economic dynamism. Also, to achieve political stability and economic development is necessary to promote cooperation at regional and sub-regional level which is built on common values. Through this approach, E.U. aims at forming a circle of friends to be part of in a stable security environment. In exchange for this stable climate, prosperous and inclined to favor cooperation, member states will benefit from the perspective of economic integration through access to the E.U. market and the four freedoms of the people, goods, services and capital. However, it will not pursue a possible EU accession of these states, but building the necessary environment cooperation. To encourage this partnership it mentioned the success that had with the Mediterranean policy and how the states included in free trade agreements have harmonized rules in the Union. They were-opening approach these partnerships were Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, with them being signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.

Based on the concept of Wider Europe it was created the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which refers to a strategy adopted in 2004, driven by the fundamental decision of enlargement towards east, which caused the Union to be faced with challenges to which it had to find solutions. Through ENP it specifies and reinforces cooperation at regional and sub-regional level and at the same time proposing ways for its development. New neighbors in the East were at the same time those that could produce new threats to European security. ENP Action Plans together with each state included in the concept of Wider Europe - Eastern Europe and Mediterranean states. Programs under the Neighbourhood Policy will be supported by the European Neighbourhood.

Launched in 2009, with the summit in Prague Eastern Partnership is an initiative of Poland and Sweden and is based on the concept of common interests and respect for international law, democracy human rights and added market economy, sustainable development and good governance to its base. Its purpose is to encourage political association and economic integration between the EU and Member States. Based on the stated purpose of the Partnership, we can raise the question how can we define the interest of the E.U. as long as every state seems to have its own national interest? Even more, we know how a state is defined, but can we operate with a similar definition for the E.U.?

The Partnership is the instrument that will address especially to the eastern side of the European Neighbourhood Policy, in order to ensure no conflicts and to enforce the principles and norms of international law. To achieve these goals, will promote regional development and social cohesion, aiming at including the gap between Member States and consistency between the regional approach and what happens to the system through international instruments.

For states that wish to reach these goals will be concluded Association Agreements, and they will provide the formal framework in which cooperation will take place and will focus primarily to the economic dimension by creating free trade areas, which will create a synthesis between liberalization and regulation. Turn the adjustment shall be made by applying standards agreed by the E.U. through the European Commission. Besides the economic dimension of cooperation, EaP uses institution building, which will be completed by each participating country and will aim to improve the administrative capacity in various ways, such as for example technical assistance, training. With regard to citizens, PAE provides increased mobility of citizens and supports the lifting of visa facilitation agreements to take back their. Lifting visa will be an objective that will be discussed individually with each state participating in the Partnership and will be addressed in partnership with another initiative of its Global Approach to Migration. Since the Partnership addresses the Eastern dimension of E.U.'s border, the place where it supplies the largest amount of energy, the sensitive issue of energy security has a special place in the cooperation of the partners. Security in this field will be made by pursuing a lasting supply that is safe and stable, using this sense to better organize and streamline the process by using renewable resources. Understanding energy as an interdependent resource could be said with clarity that the Association Agreements should be based on the energy policy of the Member States and on the E.U. Strategic Energy. Decisions to be taken in this regard will be common and will lead to building an environment that will facilitate the exchange of experience and information for those countries that are moving towards reform and modernization. In turn, this multilateral framework of cooperation can form common positions and actions. The four steps of action that the Commission will take for development cooperation are: democracy, good governance and stability to economic integration and harmonization with E.U. policies, energy security and contacts between people. Comprehensive and harmonized approach to the region is strengthened by the mentioning in the Partnership Framework Document of the Black Sea Synergy as a special place, probably due to proximity to a link to east. For each State will be selected that instrument that could bring the most benefits.

Conclusions

Involving a large number of actors both state and non-State in the problems of the region is also followed during this orientation towards the East, probably in order to realize the importance and implications of problems in their area. With them are ministries and agencies, parliaments, civil society, international organizations - such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and OECD, international financial institutions, private sector and social partners. Based on the overwhelming success had by the implementation of policies regarding the Northern and Southern borders of the E.U., European Commission through to attempt to repeat this winning strategy in Eastern Europe. It remains to be seen whether such an approach by the most direct and important so far, the Russian Federal will get the same results. It is very probable that the Arab Spring will put pressure on the way in which interests are prioritized.

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