

CABINETS OPERATING RULES AND COALITION FORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract

After the fall of communism in the late '80 in Central and Eastern Europe, due to the appearance of several political parties in each state, there was the need to form coalitions in order to provide support for the governments.

This paper aims to identify the institutional features that influence the coalition formation process using the rational choice institutionalism approach. In this case, the political parties, who seek to optimize their benefits in the government formation process, are constrained by the institutional environment. The institutional environment comprises the rules that determine how the governments are formed. Particularly, this paper aim is to identify how the cabinet operating rules affect the outcomes of the coalition formation process.

In order to do so, I will develop a quantitative analysis of 110 cabinets in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria formed after the first free elections subsequent to the communist fall until the beginning of 2010. These countries represent the post-communist states that joined the European Union, finalizing the democratization process at least from a formal point a view.

This cross-country comparison tries to explain how some institutional features influence the formation of coalitions in new democracies. This research is valuable due to the lack of this type of comparative studies on Central and Eastern European states.

Keywords: *coalition formation, institutions, cabinet operating rules, Prime Minister, cabinet*

I. Introduction

The classical theories on coalition formation were trying to explain the best formula that a coalition must have in order to form governments. Thus, Riker, Axelrod or De Swan had in mind different assumptions about parties' motivations regarding government formation and built models like minimal-winning coalition, minimal connected coalition or minimal policy distance in order to explain the best formulae of the coalitions. The problem with this kind of models is that they offer a large set of viable coalitions that there were not suitable for predictions.

Once the institutionalist theories regarding coalition formation were developed this type of problem was no longer present. The institutional approach tries to explain the social outcomes not only taking into consideration agent's preferences and the optimizing behavior, but also taking into consideration the institutional environment that will optimize human actions in achieving their goals and it will shape the agent's behavior.¹ These theories have as main subject of study the rational agent, like the rational choice theory, but in the case of the institutional approach, the agents' actions are constrained by institutions.

In the case of the coalition formation process, the rational agents are the political parties that seek to optimize their benefits in the government formation process and the institutions are the

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¹ Shepsle, Keneth, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach" *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1 (2) (1989), 135; Peters, B. Guy, "El Nuevo Institucionalismo – La teoria institucional en ciencia politica", (Barcelona, Gedisa, 2003), 73

constraints imposed to the parties by the formal or informal rules characterizing a particular party system. In an article from 1994, Kaare Strøm, Michael Laver and Ian Budge identified five types of institutions that influence the coalition formation process: the ones that affect the cabinet formation, the ones concerning cabinets operating rules, the ones concerning the legislative rules, the ones concerning parties' politics of coalition and the ones concerning external veto players².

In this paper I shall analyze the way that cabinet operating rules as institutions affect coalition formation in ten states in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to do so, I develop a quantitative data analysis on the coalition formed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

Although there are a number of case-studies on coalition formation in the states from Central and Eastern Europe area, there are not many cross-country comparisons on this area.

II. Cabinets operating rules in Central and Eastern Europe

Cabinets operating rules as constraints that affect coalition formation refers mainly to decision-making rules within the cabinet. Their source stays within the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility. "There are three key elements of collective responsibility, which concerns the Cabinet as an entity. The *confidence* element requires that the Cabinet must have the confidence of Parliament to remain in office, and must resign if it loses a vote of confidence. [...] The *confidentiality* element requires that the proceedings of, and advice to, the Cabinet shall be confidential. [...] The *unanimity* element requires all members of the Cabinet shall publicly support the decisions of the Cabinet or resign."³ In the states where this doctrine is powerful there are better chances to form coalitions that include parties with close ideological positions. Instead, if this doctrine is weak the parties with strong preferences concerning public policies are not likely to become partners into a governmental coalition.

Thus, we have states where cabinet decision making is treated collectively and states where ministers responsibility is individual.

The effects of different cabinet operating rules can be noticed at the level of cabinet party composition, but also, in the way that different actors may influence decision-making process concerning a certain bill. Thus, John Huber and Nolan McCarty (2001) draft two models of how different cabinet operating rules work. First of all, the authors assume the Prime-Minister's power to act unilaterally in demanding the Parliaments vote of confidence and, secondly, the necessity of the Prime-Ministers to obtain cabinet collective approval before demanding Parliaments' vote of confidence.

Huber and McCarty, in developing their two formal models, take into consideration two different examples of cases concerning operating rules. First, they take into consideration the example of Norway, where the Prime-Minister "can act unilaterally to make a vote on a particular policy a vote on the continued existence of a government. In such systems, if members of parliament adopt or threaten to adopt a bill that the prime-minister does not like s/he can make his or her preferred policy a question of confidence. This forces the parliament either to accept the prime ministers policy or to bring the government down."⁴

On the other hand, in order to develop their second model the authors take as an example Netherlands where the decision of demanding a vote of confidence from the Parliament stands within the collective approval of the cabinet. "In such countries, if the partners in government withhold

² Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael Laver, "Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracy", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 38, no. 2 (May 1994): 308-321.

³ Palmer, Matthew, "Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility", *The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*, Vol. 11, no. 1 (1995), 172

⁴ Huber John and Nolan McCarty, "Cabinet Decision Rules and Political Uncertainty in Parliamentary Bargaining", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, no. 2, (2001), 346

approval, the prime minister cannot make the final policy a confidence issue. Instead, either s/he must resign (if s/he does not support the policy) or the bill proposed in parliament is voted against the status quo, and a defeat results in maintenance of the status quo (but not government failure)⁵. Thus, in systems like the one in Netherlands, the problem of choosing a strategy stands mostly with the coalition partners than with the prime minister, accordingly with their position on a certain bill.

The formal models proposed by the authors assume the interactions between two players, the prime-minister *P* and the coalition partner *C*, which is a pivotal member of the governmental majority. In the unilateral model (where the prime minister can ask for a vote of confidence without cabinet approval), in the initial stage the coalition partner proposes a bill which takes effect if *P* does not invoke a vote of confidence. The prime minister may react at the proposal of the bill by the coalition partner in of three ways: (1) he can accept it (end of the game with the bill as an outcome), (2) he can resign (end of the game, with the maintenance of the status quo as an outcome) or (3) he may invoke unilaterally a vote of confidence for the proposal of any other bill. If the prime-minister uses the vote of confidence, then the coalition partner may either accept or reject the bill proposed by *P*. If *C* accepts the bill proposed by *P*, than the outcome will be the bill proposed by *P*. If *C* rejects the bill proposed by *P*, the government must resign and the outcome will be the maintenance of the status quo⁶.

With regard to the ‘collective cabinet’ (where the Prime-Minister must obtain the cabinet approval in order to invoke a vote of confidence), the game begins with the proposal of a bill by the coalition partner. The prime minister may (1) accept this bill or (2) make a motion in the cabinet that another bill preferred by him be treated as a question of confidence. If *P* makes the motion, than *C* will have to decide whether to approve it or to reject it in the cabinet. If *C* accepts the motion than the outcome will be the bill proposed by *P*. If *C* rejects the motion, the prime-minister may allow either for the bill proposed by *C* to be debated in the Parliament or to resign, the outcome being the maintenance of the status quo⁷.

The models formulated by Huber and McCarty have implications on the government termination and also on coalition formation. Concerning the latter, the models particularly refer to the prime ministers party identity. According to Lieven de Winter, the outcomes of the coalition formation process are the party composition of the government, the prime ministers party identity, the general orientation of the government’s policy-making agenda, the allocation of the ministerial portfolios and competences between the parties in the coalition and the identity of the actors that will be given these portfolios⁸. Thus, “if the prime-ministers have significantly more power to influence policy outcomes under unilateral cabinet decision rules, then the costs to the governing coalition of selecting a prime-minister with extreme preferences will be significantly greater in unilateral than collective systems.”⁹

The number of studies concerning the way cabinet operating rules influence coalition formation is generally low¹⁰. The main reason for this is represented by the fact that the constitutions of the states do not specify a certain type of rules concerning the way that a cabinet must make a decision and so, is assumed that once the cabinet it is formed it will act as an unitary actor. As Huber and McCarty demonstrated, the individual or collective action of the cabinet’s members may influence both the government termination and the coalition formation.

⁵ Huber and McCarty, *Cabinet Decision Rules...*, 346-347

⁶ Huber and McCarty, *Cabinet Decision Rules...*, 347

⁷ Huber and McCarty, *Cabinet Decision Rules...*, 347-348

⁸ De Winter, Lieven, “The role of Parliament in government formation and resignation” in *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, edited by Herbert Doring, (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), 116

⁹ Huber and McCarty, *Cabinet Decision Rules...*, 353

¹⁰ Müller, Wolfgang C., Torbjörn Bergman and Kaare Strom, “Coalition Theory and Cabinet Governance: An Introduction” in *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, edited by Kaare Strom, Müller, Wolfgang C. and Torbjörn Bergman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)

Regarding the way cabinets in Central and Eastern Europe operate, the Constitutions of the states in this area are reserved concerning this problem. In order to identify cabinets operating rules in this area I have taken into account the constitutional provisions regarding the way that the cabinet functions.

The constitutions of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia are reserved concerning this problem. Thus, these constitutions only refer to the type of governmental acts that may be adopted, without mentioning the internal procedure of the cabinet¹¹. Concerning the constitutions of Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia, it is explicitly mentioned the necessity of obtaining a majority inside the cabinet for all the acts of the government.¹²

Thus, we can distinguish between cabinets operating rules taking into consideration the way the decisions are made inside the cabinet. In the cases where the decisions may be made unilaterally by the prime-minister, we shall consider that the cabinets operating rules are individual, while in the cases where decision-making inside the cabinet assumes its collective approval – obtained through voting – we shall consider that the cabinets operating rules are collective. In table 1 we can observe the operating rules of the cabinet in the ten states studied.

Table 1

Cabinets operating rule	
Individual	Collective
Romania	Latvia
Bulgaria	Lithuania
Poland	Czech Republic
Estonia	Slovakia
Slovenia	
Hungary	

III. Research design and data collection

In this study I will analyze how the cabinets operating rules as institutions affect coalition formation in ten states in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to do so, I shall develop a quantitative data analysis on the coalition formed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

I will do so in order to verify the hypothesis developed by Strøm et.al according to which in the states where cabinets operating rules assume the collective action of the cabinet members the coalitions that are formed will include parties ideologically close to each other, while in the states

¹¹ According to Article 108 of the Romanian Constitution available on-line at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=3#t3c3s0a107 accessed on March 1st 2011, Articles 108 and 115 of the Bulgarian Constitution available on-line at <http://www.parliament.bg/en/const> accessed on March 1st 2011, According to Article 160 of the Constitution of Poland available on-line at <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm> accessed on March 1st 2011, According to Article 96 of the Estonian Constitution available on-line at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/en00000_html accessed on March 1st 2011, According to Article 117 of the Slovenian Constitution available on-line at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/si00000_html accessed on March 1st 2011, According to Article 39/A of the Hungarian Constitution available on-line at <http://www.lectlaw.com/files/int05.htm> accessed on March 1st 2011

¹² According to Article 61 of the Latvian Constitution available on-line at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/lg00000_html, accessed on March 1st 2011, Article 95 of the Lithuanian Constitution available on-line at <http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm> accessed on March 1st 2011, Article 76 of the Czech Constitution available on-line at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ez00000_html, accessed on March 1st 2011, Article 118 of the Lithuanian Constitution available on-line at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/lo00000_html accessed on March 1st 2011,

where cabinets operating rules assume the individual action of the cabinet members the coalitions that are formed will include parties ideologically distant to each other.

Thus, I shall consider as independent variable the type of cabinet operating rule and as a dependent variable the type of coalition formed in each state. Concerning the independent variable, I shall note with 1 the states where cabinets operating rules assume the individual action of the cabinet members and with 2 the states where cabinets operating rules assume the collective action of the cabinet members. Concerning the type of coalition, they can be either compact, noted with, 1 and distant, noted with 2.

In order to establish the type of coalition, I shall use as an index the ideological distance between the most distant parties from the government. In order to estimate the latter, I shall use the 'Rile' (Right-Left) score of the governmental parties using the formula:

$$D_{GP} = |GP_H - GP_L|$$

where D_{GP} represents the ideological distance between the governmental parties, GP_H represents the governmental party with the highest Rile score or, other way said, the Right-est governmental party and GP_L represents the governmental party with the lowest Rile score or other way said, the Left-est governmental party.

In order to establish parties' ideological positions on the Left-Right scale, there one of these methods can be used: expert surveys, mass surveys and content analysis of parties' manifestos. The first two types of methods represent indirect sources of data regarding to the ideological positions of the parties. The content analysis of parties' manifestos is a direct one because is focused on parties' documents.¹³ The Rile Score used in this study is established by using this last method. In this paper, I shall use the data provided by "Comparative Manifestos Project" (CMP) for the period 1990-2009.

This method assumes the division of the text into phrases or sentence that have policy content and that are named coding-units. These coding-units are assigned to a particular policy domain and policy category included into a predetermined coding scheme. Once the coding-units are included in the coding scheme, their number is standardized taking as bases their total number. Afterwards, they are transformed in percentages and so their sum will always be 100%¹⁴. (Greco, 2008: 124).

The method of establishing the Rile index used at CMP was developed in 1992 by Michael Laver and Ian Budge. They developed a factor analysis of the seven index variables, public policy areas in the scheme of categories, including 28 points of reference units or coding units. From this analysis two factors were extracted corresponding to the distinction between Left and Right. All of the reference units or index variables were corresponding to either factor of the "Left" or factor "Right", were included in this scale. The final scale was constructed by subtracting the size of "Left" in size "Right"¹⁵

Concerning the data collection, I used the Constitutions of the studied states in order to identify the type of cabinets operating rules.

I have used the study by Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Sona N. Golder¹⁶ in order to identify the coalitions formed in the states taken into consideration in this study after the fall of communism until 2008 and official websites states for coalitions studied by early 2010. I corroborated these data

¹³ Greco, Răzvan, "Party Competition in Central and Eastern Europe: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania", (Phd Thesis, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, 2008), 124

¹⁴ Greco, "Party Competition in...", 124

¹⁵ Dinas, Einas and Kostas Gemenis, "Measuring parties' ideological positions with manifesto data – A critical evaluation on the competing methods", *Party Politics*, OnlineFirst, published on December 3, 2009 as doi:10.1177/1354068809343107, 3

¹⁶ Ryals Conrad, Courtney and Sona N. Golder "Measuring government duration and stability in Central Eastern European democracies", *European Journal of Political Research*, 49.

with the one existing in the database ParlGov. I excluded from this research the caretaker governments, single party majority governments and single party minority governments because cabinets operating rules as institutional constraints cannot be considered in their context. The types of coalition considered in this research are: minority coalitions, minimal winning coalitions and oversized coalitions.

Regarding the index, I used the Rile scores of the governmental party from the „Comparative Manifestos Project” database and I calculated the ideological distance of the governmental parties according to the formula mentioned above.

I.IV. Results

In this paper I analyzed 92 governments formed by coalitions in the ten studied states. They are found in table 2 where there are also mentioned cabinets operating rules.

Table 2

State	Types of cabinet operating rules	Number of cabinets
Bulgaria	1	3
Czech Republic	2	8
Estonia	1	8
Hungary	1	7
Latvia	2	17
Lithuania	2	7
Poland	1	13
Romania	1	11
Slovakia	2	9
Slovenia	1	9
Total		92

Thus, there are 54,3% (50 cabinets) from the studied cases that formed in states where cabinet operating rules assume the unilateral action of the Prime Minister and 42,7% (42 cabinets) from the studied cases that formed in states where cabinet operating rules assume cabinets collective approval.

Concerning the index used, the ideological distance between the most distant parties from the government, the 92 cases group themselves between 1,51 (the Slovakian governments lead by Vladimir Merciar between 12.01.1993-18.03.1993 and 17.11.1993-14.03.1994) and 75,67 (the Slovene government lead by Janez Drnovsek between 12.01.1993-29.03.1994). The mean of the ideological distances of the governmental parties is 21,17, while the median value is 17,79.

In order to do the division between the ideological compact coalitions and ideological distant coalition I took into consideration the average between the most extreme values of the index used, this value being 38,59. Thus all the coalitions whose value of the ideological distance between the most apart parties in the government is between 1,51 and 38,59 will be considered ideological compact coalitions and those whose value is between 38,59 and 75,67 will be considered ideological distant coalitions. We can observe their frequency in table 3.

Table 3

State	Types of cabinet operating rules	Types of coalition		Total
		Compact	Distant	
Bulgaria	1	3	0	3
Czech Republic	2	6	2	8
Estonia	1	8	0	8
Hungary	1	7	0	7
Latvia	2	14	3	17
Lithuania	2	7	0	7
Poland	1	10	3	13
Romania	1	11	0	11
Slovakia	2	9	0	9
Slovenia	1	5	4	9
Total		80	12	92

From the total of 92 studied cases, 87% (80 cabinets) fall within the category of ideologically compact coalitions and only 13% of studied cases (12 cabinets) fall within the category of ideologically distant coalitions.

From the 80 cabinets that fall within the category of ideologically compact coalitions 55% (44 cabinets) are coalitions that formed in states where cabinet operating rules assume the unilateral action of the Prime Minister and 45% (36 cabinets) are coalitions that formed in states where cabinet operating rules assume cabinets collective approval. Regarding the 12 cabinets that fall within the category of ideologically distant coalitions the proportion is equal between the two types of coalitions taken into consideration.

From the total of 50 cabinets that formed in the states where cabinets operating rules assume the unilateral action of the Prime Minister, 88% (44 cabinets) are ideologically compact coalitions while only 12% (6 cabinets) are coalitions that include ideologically distant parties. From the total of 42 cabinets that formed in states where cabinets operating rules assume the collective action of the cabinet approximately 85% (36 cabinets) are ideologically compact coalitions and only approximately 15% (6 cabinets) are ideologically distant coalitions.

The results of the quantitative data analysis confirms the hypothesis of Strom, Budge and Laver concerning the formation of compact coalitions in systems with collective cabinets operating rules, but not the part concerning the formation of coalitions in systems with cabinets operating rules that assume the unilateral action of the Prime Minister.

In order to verify this statement I correlated the two variables with regard to cabinet operating rule and the type of coalition. The results are found in table 4.

Table 4

		Cabinets operating rules	Type of coalitions
Cabinets operating rules	Pearson Correlation	1	,034
	Sig. (2-tailed)		,749
	N	92	92
Type of coalitions	Pearson Correlation	,034	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,749	
	N	92	92

Thus, it can be observed that the intensity between the two variables is very low, given the fact that the Pearson coefficient rather tends to 0. On the other hand, the fact that the value of the significance test of the correlation coefficient exceeds 0,1 demonstrates the fact that there is not a strong correlation between those two variables.

V. Concluding remarks

In this paper I analyzed how institutional constraints like cabinets operating rules influence coalition formation in ten states in Central and Eastern Europe. In order to do so, I took into consideration if the cabinet's members must approve Prime Minister's decisions in order to validate them or the Prime Minister can make decisions unilateral regarding the whole cabinet.

The analysis contains 92 cabinets that were formed through coalitions from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. In this paper I verified if Strøm et al. hypothesis regarding cabinets operating rules applies on the studied cases.

Following the results of the quantitative data analysis we can invalidate the assumption that ideologically compact coalitions will rather form in countries where operating rules require Cabinets collective approval in the decision-making process, while the ideologically distant coalitions will rather form in states where cabinets operating rules require the Prime Minister's unilateral action in the decision-making process. Moreover, this analysis shows that in the studied countries ideologically compact coalitions tend to form.

Following the correlation analysis between the two variables we can say that first of all the intensity between them is very low and, secondly that between them there is not a strong correlation.

Thus, we can conclude that on the set of studied systems, institutions like cabinets operating rules do not influence the coalition formation process.

Appendix – Governmental parties ideological distance in Central and Eastern Europe 1990-2010

	Prime-Minister	Parties into coalition	Period	Ideological Distance
Bulgaria	Simeon Saksoburggotski	NDS, DPS	24.07.2001-21.02.2005	18,72
	Simeon Saksoburggotski	NDS, DPS, NPT	22.02.2005-22.06.2005	18,72
	Sergei Stanishev	BSP, NDS, DPS	16.08.2005-31.12.1998	21,10
Czech Republic	Vaclav Klaus	ODS, KDU/CSL, ODA	1.01.1993-1.06.1996	37,39
	Vaclav Klaus	ODS, KDU/CSL, ODA	05.07.2010-20.11.1997	17,72
	Vladimir Spidla	CSSD, KDU/CSL, US	15.07.2002-1.07.2004	16,89
	Stanislav Gross	CSSD, KDU/CSL, US	4.08.2004-30.03.2005	16,89
	Stanislav Gross	CSSD, US	31.03.2005-25.04.2005	16,89
	Jiri Pariubek	CSSD, KDU/CSL,	26.04.2005-	16,89

		US	2.06.2006	
	Mirek Topolaneck	ODS,KDU/CSL, SZ	9.01.2007- 15.03.2009	46,13
	Jan Fischer	ODS, CSSD	8.05.2009-	50,20
Estonia	Mart Laar	I, M, ERSP	21.10.1990- 26.09.1994	24,72
	Tiit Vähi	KMÜ, K	17.04.1995- 11.10.1995	21,01
	Tiit Vähi	KMÜ, RE	3.11.1995- 20.11.1996	6,98
	Mart Laar	I, RE, M	25.03.1999- 8.01.2002	32,39
	Siim Kallas	RE, K	28.01.2002- 2.03.2003	14,66
	Juhan Parts	ResP, RE, RL	9.04.2003- 24.03.2005	7,18
	Andrus Ansip	RE, K, RL	13.04.2005- 4.03.2007	4,60
	Andrus Ansip	RE, IRL, SDE	5.04.2007-	16,03
	Latvia	Valdis Birkavs	LC, LZS	8.07.1993- 15.07.1994
Maris Gailis		LC, TPA	15.09.1994- 1.10.1995	16,69
Andris Skele		DPS, LC, TB, LNNK/LZP, LZS/LKDS/LLDP, LVP	21.12.1995- 20.01.1997	54,88
Andris Skele		DPS, LC, TB, LNNK/LZP, LZS/LKDS/LLDP, LVP	13.02.1997- 28.07.1997	54,88
Guntars Krasts		TB/LNNK, LC, DPS, LZS/LKDS/LLDP	7.08.1997- 8.04.1998	53,88
Guntars Krasts		TB/LNNK, LC, LZS,LKDS	9.04.1998- 3.10.1998	27,40
Vilis Kristopans		LC, TB/LNNK, JP	26.11.1998- 3.02.1999	18,78
Vilis Kristopans		LC, TB/LNNK, JP, LSDA	04.02.2010- 4.07.1999	21,69
Andris Skele		TP, TB/LNNK, LC	16.07.1999- 12.04.2000	3,98
Andris Berzins		TP, TB/LNNK, LC	5.05.2000- 5.10.2002	3,98
Elinars Repse		TP, LC, TB/LNNK, JP	7.11.2002- 5.02.2004	21,33
Indulis Emsis		JL, ZZS, LPP	9.03.2004- 28.10.2006	13,71
Aigars Kalvitis		TP, ZZS, LPP, JL	2.12.2004-	13,94

			8.04.2006	
	Aigars Kalvitis	TP, ZZS, LPP	9.04.2006- 7.10.2006	11,66
	Aigars Kalvitis	TP, ZZS, LPP, TB/LNNK	7.11.2006- 5.12.2007	14,67
	Ivars Godmanis	LPP, TP, TB/LNNK, ZZS	20.12.2007- 12.03.2009	14,67
	Valdis Dobrovskis	JP, ZSS, TP, LPP, TB/LNNK,	12.03.2009-	26,43
Lithuania	Gediminas Vagnorius	TS(LK), LKDP, LCS	4.12.1996- 3.05.1999	14,54
	Rolandas Paksas	TS(LK), LKDP	1.06.1999- 27.10.1999	5,71
	Andrius Kubilius	TS(LK), LKDP	3.11.1999- 8.10.2000	5,71
	Rolandas Paksas	LLS, NS	30.10.2000- 20.06.2001	11,07
	Algirdas Brazauskas	LSPD, NS	5.07.2001- 24.10.2004	3,59
	Algirdas Brazauskas	LSPD, NS, DP, LVLS	14.12.2004- 11.04.2006	3,59
	Algirdas Brazauskas	LSPD, DP, LVLS	12.04.2006- 31.05.2006	9,06
Poland	Jan Olszewski	PC, WAK, PL	2.12.1991- 4.06.1992	36,16
	Hanna Suchocka	UD, KLD, PCD, PL, PPG, PSL, WAK	11.07.1992- 28.04.1993	35,31
	Hanna Suchocka	UD, KLD, PCD, PPG, PSL, WAK	29.04.1993- 28.05.1993	35,31
	Waldermar Pawlak	SLD, PSL	26.10.1993- 7.02.1995	2,52
	Jozef Olesky	SLD, PSL	6.03.1995- 24.01.1996	2,52
	Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	SLD, PSL	7.02.1996- 21.09.1997	2,52
	Jerzy Buzek	AWS, UW	31.10.1997- 6.06.2000	19,01
	Leszek Miller	SLD, PSL, UP	19.10.2001- 3.03.2003	39,58
	Leszek Miller	SLD, UP	4.03.2003- 2.05.2004	3,69
	Marek Belka	SLD, UP, SDPL	24.06.2004- 25.10.2005	3,69
	Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz	PiS, SRP, LPR	5.05.2006- 10.07.2006	38,86
	Jaroslav Kaczynski	PiS, SRP, LPR	14.07.2006- 12.08.2007	38,86
	Donald Tusk	PO, PSL	16.11.2007-	3,69

Romania	Nicolae Văcăroiu	PDSR, PUNR	19.08.1994- 1.09.1996	27,64
	Victor Ciorbea	CDR (PNȚCD, PNL, PAR), USD (PD, PSDR) UDMR	12.12.1996- 5.02.1998	22,79
	Victor Ciorbea	CDR (PNȚCD, PNL, PAR), USD, PSDR, UDMR	6.02.1998- 30.03.1998	22,79
	Radu Vasile	CDR (PNȚCD, PNL, PAR), USD (PD, PSDR) UDMR	15.04.1998- 29.10.1998	22,79
	Radu Vasile	CDR (PNȚCD, PNL), USD (PD, PSDR) UDMR	30.10.1998- 13.12.1999	22,79
	Mugur Isaescu	CDR (PNȚCD, PNL, PAR), USD (PD, PSDR) UDMR	21.12.1999- 26.11.2000	22,79
	Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu	PNL, PD, UDMR, PUR	29.12.2004- 3.12.2006	6,66
	Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu	PNL, PD, UDMR,	4.12.2006- 1.04.2007	6,66
	Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu	PNL, UDMR	2.04.2007- 30.11.2008	6,66
	Emil Boc	PD-L, PSD	22.12.2008- 1.10.2009	17,86
	Emil Boc	PD-L, UDMR	23.12.2009-	7,95
Slovakia	Vladimir Merciar	HZDS, SNS	12.01.1993- 18.03.1993	1,51
	Vladimir Merciar	HZDS, SNS	17.11.1993- 14.03.1994	1,51
	Jozef Moravcik	DUS,SDL,KDH	16.03.1994- 1.10.1994	24,97
	Vladimir Merciar	HZDS, SNS, ZRS	12.12.1994- 26.09.1998	14,70
	Mikulas Dzurinda	SDK, SDL, SMK, SOP	30.10.1998- 21.09.2002	12,31
	Mikulas Dzurinda	SDKU, SMK, KDH, ANO	16.10.2002- 1.09.2005	37,96
	Mikulas Dzurinda	SDKU, SMK, KDH	2.09.2005- 6.02.2006	37,96
	Mikulas Dzurinda	SDKU, SMK	7.02.2006- 17.06.2006	37,96
	Robert Fico	Smer-SD, SNS, LS-HZDS	4.07.2006-	29,33
Slovenia	Janez Drnovsek	LDS, ZLSD, SKD, SDSS	12.01.1993- 29.03.1994	75,67

	Janez Drnovsek	LDS, ZLSD, SKD	30.03.1994- 26.01.1996	65,34
	Janez Drnovsek	LDS, SKD	27.01.1996- 10.11.1996	65,34
	Janez Drnovsek	LDS, SLS, DESUS	27.02.1997- 8.04.2000	41,58
	Andrej Bajuk	SLS/SKD, SDSS	7.06.200- 15.10.2000	23,38
	Janez Drnovsek	LDS, ZLSD, SLS, DESUS	30.11.2000- 12.12.2002	20,22
	Anton Rop	LDS, ZLSD, SLS, DESUS	19.12.2002- 3.11.2004	20,22
	Janez Jansa	SDS, SLS, NSI, DESUS	3.12.2004- 21.09.2008	20,20
	Borut Pahor	SD, ZARES, DESUS, LDS	21.11.2008-	18,54
Hungary	Josef Antall	MDF, FKGP, KDNP	23.05.1990- 12.12.1993	15,18
	Peter Boross	MDF, FKGP, KDNP	21.12.1993- 29.05.1994	15,18
	Gyula Horn	MSZP, SZDSZ	15.07.1994- 24.04.1998	22,92
	Viktor Orban	FIDESZ, MDF, FKGP	8.07.1998- 21.04.2002	12,21
	Peter Medgyessy	MSZP, SZDSZ	27.05.2002- 24.08.2004	14,25
	Ferenc Gyurcsany	MSZP, SZDSZ	30.09.2004- 23.04.2006	14,25
	Ferenc Gyurcsany	MSZP, SZDSZ	9.06.2006- 30.04.2008	14,25

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